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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars, policy makers, the media,1 and the public have spent years 
discussing a single problem2 with many names: work/family conflict,3 
the maternal wall,4 caregiver discrimination, family responsibilities 
                                                     
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.  I wish to thank 
Professors Joseph Slater and Rebecca Zietlow for their valuable feedback.  I am also grateful for the 
feedback I received when I presented this Article at the Third Annual Labor & Employment 
Colloquium in San Diego, California, in October 2008; the Ohio Legal Scholars Workshop in 
January 2009; as well as the feedback received from the faculties of the University of Toledo 
College of Law and the University of Indiana-Indianapolis; where I presented the Article at 
workshops.  Matthew Kizaur provided valuable research and editing support.  I am grateful for the 
summer research grant provided by the College of Law, which made this Article possible. 
 1. See, e.g., Kathy Lauer-Williams, Mom Fights for Law Against Maternal Profiling, 
MORNING CALL, Mar. 17, 2008, at A1; Mary Seguin, Editorial, The “Mommy Track” Myth, 
PROVIDENCE J., July 28, 2007, available at http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors 
/content/CT_seguin28_07-28-07_M45VR3J.11d5989.html; Ian Shapira, Bringing Up Babies, and 
Defying the Norm, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2008, at A01; Suzy Welch, Can You Work This Weekend?, 
O MAGAZINE, Mar. 2008, at 91. 
 2. For a discussion of the problem’s prevalence, see Joan C. Williams, The U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Statement at the Meeting of April 17, 2007, Washington D.C. 
on Perspectives on Work/Family Balance and the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Laws 
(Apr. 17, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/4-17-
07/williams.html) (stating that more than 100 articles have been published about family 
responsibilities discrimination (FRD) and that there has been a 400 percent increase in FRD cases 
over the past decade, with a higher success rate compared to other types of employment 
discrimination cases). 
 3. See generally Laura T. Kessler, Keeping Discrimination Theory Front and Center in the 
Discourse over Work and Family Conflict, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 313 (2007). 
 4. Professor Joan Williams coined the term “maternal wall,” JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 69–70 (2000) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER], which I find very apt, although under-inclusive.  In 
more recent articles, Williams has referred to this problem as “family responsibilities 
discrimination,” to recognize the fact that the problem affects not just women, but also men, and to 
recognize the fact that some caregivers are caring for elderly parents or other family members. Joan 
C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 171 (2006). 
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discrimination,5 and the attachment gap,6 among others.  I call it the 
“caregiver conundrum,”7 referring to the fact that this topic has puzzled 
me and others for years.  What is the caregiver conundrum?  Simply put, 
it is the difficulty caregivers8 face when trying to balance their caregiving 
responsibilities with their work responsibilities.  Caregivers face 
conflicts both at home and at work when work responsibilities clash with 
responsibilities at home.9  In many cases, these conflicts create serious 
hardships on the caregivers and their loved ones. 
Finding a solution to this pressing problem is puzzling because 
courts and scholars disagree on the scope of the problem.  Thus far, 
courts only protect employees who experience caregiver discrimination 
because the employer incorrectly assumes the employee will not meet the 
workplace requirements.10  In other words, courts only protect “ideal 
workers,” 11 who never miss work because of caregiving responsibilities.  
But for many women12 who cannot conscientiously delegate all of their 
                                                     
 5. See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4. 
 6. Laura Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural 
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 371 
(2001). 
 7. Conundrum is defined as: “anything that puzzles.”  RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY 443 (2d ed. 1993). 
 8. For purposes of this Article, the term caregiver refers to either parents or those caring for 
their elderly, sick, or disabled relatives. 
 9. See Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental 
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 306 (2004) (discussing a study where 
thirty percent of adults had experienced a conflict the previous week). 
 10. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).  For additional 
information, see discussion infra Part III.A. 
 11. I again thank Professor Williams for this term. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 
4, at 6, 64.  I use this term frequently to describe what most employers expect to have—employees 
who are available full-time and overtime fifty weeks a year.  Id.  I do not mean to suggest that 
employers are reasonable in their expectations for ideal workers.  I also do not think many 
employees are truly “ideal” in the ordinary sense of the word.  Many employees might work full-
time and overtime and yet spend some of their time at work surfing the Internet or otherwise wasting 
time.  I recognize this term’s limitations but continue to use it because it is widely accepted and used 
in this context.  Professor Michelle Travis refers to a “full-time, face-time norm,” which I also find 
very apt.  See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2005) [hereinafter Travis, Recapturing the 
Transformative Potential] (describing a set of default organizational preferences that many 
employers have for designing the workplace around full-time positions, requiring unlimited hours or 
rigid work schedules); Michelle A. Travis, The Full-Time, Face-Time Norm: Lessons from the 
United Kingdom, 10 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 257, 258 (2006) [hereinafter Travis, The Full-
Time, Face-Time Norm] (same). 
 12. While I intend the term caregiver to be gender neutral, I sometimes refer to “women” and 
“mothers” to recognize the reality that it is mostly women who suffer from this conundrum, while 
men are sometimes the primary caregivers of their children.  See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, NOTICE, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH 
CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2007) [hereinafter EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE], available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (discussing men in caregiving roles today), it is 
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childcare, even if they have the financial means to do so, and for other 
women who do not have the means to delegate all or most of their 
childcare responsibilities, 13 occasionally their work suffers because the 
laws of physics prevent them from being in two places at once.14  These 
caregivers are what I call “real workers.”  Real workers are the 
caregivers who get the job done, probably very efficiently, but either do 
not put in as many hours as their non-caregiver counterparts, or violate 
their employers’ attendance policies because they have children or other 
family members who need care.  These are the parents to whom “life 
happens,” and they are left juggling without a lesson, which inevitably 
leads to one or more balls falling to the ground. 
Who are these real workers?  They are single moms,15 married 
moms, moms with enough money for good daycare, moms with barely 
enough money for substandard daycare, 16 and even some dads.17  They 
come in all races, religions, and sexual orientations.18  These are the 
women who feel the wage gap most severely19 and often feel like 
quitting.20  They are the caregivers who feel guilty for being just “good 
                                                                                                                       
still true that women are overwhelmingly the primary caregivers in their children’s lives, even if they 
work full-time.  WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 2; Williams & Bornstein, supra 
note 4, at 174. 
 13. See Heather S. Dixon, National Daycare: A Necessary Precursor to Gender Equality with 
Newfound Promise for Success, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561, 564–65 (2005) (arguing that 
many Americans do not have enough money for daycare). 
 14. See Williams, supra note 2 (referring to a study that found that caregiving responsibilities 
now interrupt one out of every three work days). 
 15. See EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12 (discussing the more profound effect of 
caregiving responsibilities on single mothers). 
 16. See Williams, supra note 2 (noting that many of the plaintiffs experiencing family 
responsibilities discrimination are caregivers in lower-income jobs, “for whom ‘opting out’ is not an 
option, and losing their jobs means living in poverty”). 
 17. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 
HASTINGS L. J. 1311, 1318–21 (2008) (discussing the diversity of plaintiffs who bring family 
responsibilities discrimination claims, who vary by occupation, class, race or gender). 
 18. See EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12 (noting that caregiving responsibilities 
can more dramatically affect women of color because they are more likely to be employed while 
raising young children, to be single, and to be caring for other relatives); Nancy E. Dowd, Bringing 
the Margin to the Center: Comprehensive Strategies for Work/Family Policies, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
433, 434 (2004) (stating that we should be concerned with everyone—all classes and races—when 
discussing work and life balance issues). 
 19. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 77–78 (2003) 
(“Sociological studies show that motherhood accounts for an increasing proportion of the wage gap 
between men and women. While the wages of young women without children are close to those of 
men, mothers’ wages are only sixty percent of those of fathers.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and Responsibility, 4 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 581 (2007) (discussing the problem women face). 
 20. Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 21 (2005).  In 
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enough” and frequently allow themselves to be marginalized through 
reduced hours or part-time work schedules because society has taught 
them that they are not worthy of equal wages.21  They are, after all, not 
ideal workers.  These are the caregivers who deserve our attention and 
this Article is devoted to including them in the efforts to remedy the 
caregiver conundrum.  This Article does not discuss the logistics of 
solving the caregiver conundrum; that effort is left for another day.  
Instead, this Article tackles theory first, providing the theoretical 
justification for the eventual reform piece of the puzzle.  Specifically, 
this Article proposes using a new theoretical framework, communitarian 
theory,22 to justify the protection of real workers. 
Thus far, finding solutions to protect real workers has proven 
puzzling.  Scholars recognize that caregivers who are not ideal workers 
need benefits and protections that are not offered by current employment 
laws.23  Accordingly, many of these scholars have suggested reforms to 
help real workers succeed in balancing work and life.24  However, many 
of these suggested reforms suffer from two challenges.  First, most of the 
reforms are piecemeal.  They only take care of some of the problems for 
some of the caregivers.  They either focus on high-income professional 
women who want to work fewer hours, ignoring lower-income workers 
who need to work full-time and overtime,25 or they propose measures 
aimed at getting all women to work more hours, thereby ignoring 
caregivers who can afford to spend more time doing the valuable work of 
caring for their loved ones. 26 
                                                                                                                       
fact, many women do quit because of the difficulty in balancing work and family.  Id. at 21 n.82. 
 21. See Dixon, supra note 13, at 658 (stating that women “often even view themselves as 
unworthy employees, feeling they are short-changing their employers because of their family 
responsibilities”); cf. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 20 
(discussing the system justification theory and how women rationalize their lower wages by 
believing that they are not worth the higher salaries given to men). 
 22. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 23. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 6, at 375 (recognizing that our current laws are not good 
enough to provide for the most common employment needs of caregivers). 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women in the Workplace: Which Women, Which 
Agenda, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 19–23 (2006) (discussing proposals that emphasize 
women working fewer hours or getting more workplace flexibility). 
 26. Primarily, scholars fall into two basic groups—those who favor more choices for working 
mothers to balance work and family and those who favor more workplace equality for women and 
therefore believe women should be working more.  Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation 
Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
345, 395–96 (2003); Selmi, supra note 19, at 573–74.  Compare Kaminer, supra note 9, at 308–09 
(proposing an accommodation model based on section 701(j) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act), Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1295–96 (1987) 
(discussing scholars who favor accommodation), and Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment 
Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 598–99 (2002) 
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The other limitation of many reform proposals is that they suffer 
from what I call “special-treatment stigma.”  Special-treatment stigma 
occurs when employers are unwilling to hire or promote employees who 
need special benefits or accommodations in the workplace because of the 
real or perceived costs of providing such accommodations.27  Because 
most caregivers are women, any suggested reforms that help caregivers 
may have the perverse effect of causing employers to hire or promote 
fewer women.28  Special-treatment stigma also manifests itself in the 
resentment of other employees over the perceived special treatment 
given to caregivers.29 
The solution to the first limitation—piecemeal reforms—is to devise 
reform that is broad enough to protect all workers, not just ideal workers 
and not just one subset of the caregiving population.  But doing so is 
likely to be met with substantial resistance—both apathy and 
resentment—by employers, non-caregivers, and the public.  For reasons 
discussed below, current theoretical frameworks have proven 
unsuccessful in supporting efforts at broad reform and combating 
special-treatment stigma.30  Thus, we need a new theoretical framework 
to justify broad coverage to protect all working caregivers and to respond 
to the special-treatment concern.31  Communitarian theory supplies the 
necessary justification. 
Communitarian theory’s emphasis on the priority of responsibilities 
over rights, the importance of raising children well, and working together 
to reach a common goal provides the needed justification for supporting 
broad reform efforts aimed at ending the caregiver conundrum for all 
workers—both real and ideal.32 
                                                                                                                       
(discussing the need to turn away from traditional anti-discrimination principles in the context of 
parental-status employment discrimination), with Dixon, supra note 13, at 565 (calling for a system 
of national daycare as an important step in helping women achieve gender equality), Lester, supra 
note 20, at 1–5 (advocating for paid family leave as a way to help equalize male and female 
contributions to both work and family caregiving), and Selmi, supra note 19, at 576 (arguing for 
workplace equality for women that does not entail more time away from work). 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
 29. See infra Part IV.B. 
 30. See infra Part IV.A.1, IV.B.1. 
 31. I do not mean to suggest that communitarian theory is new.  To my knowledge, however, 
this is the first Article to suggest using the communitarian theory to inform the debate regarding 
caregiver discrimination.  Other scholars have recognized the importance of caregiving and the 
problems with the liberal ideal of autonomy and equality.  See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 6, at 430–
44.  However, this is the first Article to take a systematic approach to applying the communitarian 
theory to the problem of caregiver discrimination. 
 32. See infra Part IV.A.2, IV.B.2. 
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This Article will proceed in four parts.  Part II will discuss the 
challenges facing real workers, including those who want more time with 
their family without sacrificing their careers and those who need to work 
full-time to make ends meet.  Part II will also discuss discrimination 
based on stereotyping that affects even ideal workers.33  Part III will then 
discuss how and why the current law does not adequately protect those 
caregivers who are not meeting the ideal-worker norm. 
Part IV presents this Article’s thesis.  It begins by arguing that we 
should support all caregivers, regardless of the choices they make—or 
are forced to make—in balancing work and family.  Accordingly, any 
efforts at reform should include the protection of real workers and not 
just ideal workers.  This part will discuss the two primary obstacles to 
protecting real workers—society’s emphasis on the choices parents 
make34 and the stigma that surrounds caregivers who receive special 
accommodations in the workplace.35  I first describe why current theories 
have been unsuccessful in remedying caregiver discrimination for real 
workers.  Then I discuss how a shift to communitarian theory helps to 
hurdle both of these obstacles.  Specifically, communitarian theory helps 
us understand that parenting is not merely a choice—it is a responsibility 
that benefits all of society.  Part IV then discusses how communitarian 
theory addresses special-treatment stigma, by moving away from a focus 
on the conflict between men and women or caregivers and non-
caregivers, and putting emphasis instead on working toward a common 
goal—raising the next generation, or caring for the prior generation, 
successfully. 
Part V will briefly discuss where to go from here; broadly addressing 
which reforms will be needed to solve the caregiver conundrum for all 
working caregivers, including real workers.  While reform must be 
comprehensive, this part cannot be.  Instead, it will briefly discuss a 
sampling of some of the reforms that have been suggested by other 
scholars.  Part V will then apply the communitarian framework to one 
specific reform to show how the theory provides justification for it.  
Finally, this part will briefly respond to anticipated criticisms of any 
eventual reform—that it will be too costly and burdensome on employers  
 
                                                     
 33. While it is not my primary purpose to protect ideal workers—I believe they are already 
protected by current Title VII jurisprudence—I include a discussion of them to demonstrate the full 
scope of the caregiver conundrum. 
 34. Kessler, supra note 6, at 372 (discussing the rhetoric of choice surrounding women’s 
caregiving). 
 35. See infra Part IV.B. 
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and that employers will unduly burden non-caregiving co-employees by 
passing some of the costs on to them. 
II. DESCRIBING THE CAREGIVER CONUNDRUM 
The caregiver conundrum affects caregivers in three primary ways.  
First, some caregivers need and want more time with their families and 
are either unable to obtain that balance or are only able to obtain it 
through marginalizing their careers.  Second, parents and other 
caregivers in lower-income brackets might also enjoy more time with 
their children, but are financially unable to work less or take time off for 
caregiving needs.  These caregivers need more financial support in 
addition to time off for necessary caregiving.36  Finally, some caregivers 
experience the caregiver conundrum because, even though they are 
performing as ideal workers, their employers assume they are not.  
Cognitive bias and stereotyping are responsible for this type of 
discrimination.  This part will discuss each of these in turn. 
A. Caregivers Who Need More Time 
For many caregiving employees, especially those in the middle to 
upper income brackets and professional careers, the primary impediment 
to balancing work and family is time, or the lack thereof.37  The normal 
full-time and overtime work schedule of many jobs makes it difficult for 
many workers to meet the caregiving needs of their loved ones.38  While 
there have been small legal measures aimed at alleviating this time 
crunch,39 such reforms only help caregivers in need of time off for a few 
enumerated reasons.40  What many caregivers need is the ability to take 
time off for school conferences; for doctor, dentist, and other 
appointments for their children or other loved ones in their care; and for 
recitals, classes and sporting events.41  Some parents simply want to 
work fewer hours so they can be home more, regardless of the age of 
                                                     
 36. Sometimes, these caregivers are left making an impossible choice of keeping their jobs or 
providing necessary care for their loved ones. 
 37. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 16. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 
(2006).  The FMLA is discussed in Part III. 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). 
 41. Peggie Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family 
Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1452 (2001). 
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their children.42  Many workplaces, however, do not allow this type of 
flexibility.43  Prevailing workplace practices remain firmly anchored to 
an ideal-worker norm that embodies the traditional life patterns of men.44  
It is assumed that this ideal worker takes no time off for childbearing, has 
no daytime child rearing or other caregiving responsibilities, and is 
available full-time and for overtime on short notice.45  Several workplace 
policies exemplify the time crunch experienced by working caregivers 
who are not ideal workers. 
The first of these are strict no-fault attendance policies that many 
employers adopt, especially for low-income, non-professional 
workplaces.46  Some employers allow as few as six to eight absences or 
partial-day absences in an entire year regardless of the reason.47  
Furthermore, some employers allow for little or no time off for longer 
leaves of absence.48  These policies first affect women who are pregnant 
and give birth while employed.49  Assume a woman gets pregnant while 
working for an employer with a strict attendance policy.  Even minor 
morning sickness or other minor complications make it very likely that 
she will accumulate six or more absences in a very short period of time.  
If she has worked for her employer for less than one year or her 
employer is not large enough to be covered by the Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA),50 the employer could fire her,51 and many employers do.52 
                                                     
 42. Dowd, supra note 18, at 449–54 (noting that children need care not only while they are 
infants but well into adolescence); Williams, supra note 2 (same). 
 43. See National Snapshot: The Best vs. the Rest, WORKING MOTHER, Oct. 2007, at 78 
(discussing a survey that states 58% of all companies allow flex-time, but only 20% allow job 
sharing, 33% allow telecommuting (on a part time basis) and 38% percent allow a compressed 
workweek); see also EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12 (discussing the prevalence of 
employers’ inflexible policies). 
 44. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 173–74. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FAMILIES AND WORK INST., NATIONAL STUDY OF 
EMPLOYERS 12–13 (2008) (noting that most employers offer flexible work options only to a small 
portion of employees while a substantially smaller portion are willing to offer these benefits to all 
employees); see also id. at 13 (noting that only 32% of employers let some employees change 
starting and ending times on a daily basis; only 3% of employers allow employees to work from 
home all or most working days; only 13% of employers let all or most employees work reduced 
hours; and only 45% of employers offer short periods of paid time off to attend to family needs). 
 47. EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12. 
 48. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 15 (stating that forty-nine percent of the workforce does 
not have any paid leave). 
 49. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, 40–41 (discussing a 
Seventh Circuit case, where the court considered an employer with a very rigid work schedule and a 
no-absence policy, finding no claim for a pregnant women). 
 50. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of FMLA requirements and limitations. 
 51. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 22. (“Without the FMLA, those who have no access to 
sick leave could be terminated if they were to call in sick.”). 
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After pregnancy, caregiving causes absences for many different 
reasons.53  Absent FMLA protection, the employer’s allowed absences 
have to cover sick days for the worker, sick days for the worker’s 
children, appointments, conferences at school, performances at school, 
caring for a sick parent or partner, and so on.54  Many caregivers find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to meet their employers’ very strict 
attendance policies, and hence, may find themselves making the 
impossibly unfair choice between keeping their jobs and doing what is 
required to care for their families.55  The number of women affected by 
stringent attendance policies is staggering, and most of these women are 
in the lowest income brackets.56  Some women are lucky enough to have 
a husband to help with caregiving needs, or a friend, family member, or 
neighbor who can help out when a child needs care.  But many women 
do not have any help. 57  Many women with caregiving responsibilities 
are single.58  And these days, women are less likely to have the support 
of family and friends nearby.59 
Even in workplaces without strict attendance policies, high demands 
for “face time” make it difficult for caregivers to balance work and 
family.60  Some caregivers have jobs that could be performed, at least in 
                                                                                                                       
 52. See Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 856 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing plaintiff’s 
disparate impact claim when she was fired after a miscarriage because of her employer’s policy of 
firing employees with more than three absences during a 90-day probationary period); see also 
Pamela Gershuny, Family Values First When Federal Laws Collide: A Proposal to Create a Public 
Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine Based Upon Mandatory Parenting Duty, 21 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 195, 202 (2006) (discussing cases where mother’s were fired for staying home 
with their sick children); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 57 (2007) (noting that if a woman works for an employer exempted 
from the FMLA, she has no right to sick leave if her employer chooses not to offer it). 
 53. Arnow-Richman, supra note 26 (stating that caregivers are more likely to miss work). 
 54. Again, some of these absences are covered by the FMLA, but certainly not all of them.  See 
infra Part III. 
 55. Gershuny, supra note 52, at 195 (“These parents are caught between the devil and the deep 
blue sea: they can leave their children alone or be fired.”). 
 56. EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 1–5; see O’Leary, supra note 52 (“[F]or a 
low-wage working woman who has an ordinary breakdown in childcare or a child at home with the 
flu, the hardship will be magnified by her low income and lack of control over her work schedule.”). 
 57. See EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12 (“Family crises can sometimes lead to 
discipline or even discharge when a worker violates an employer policy in order to address 
caregiving responsibilities.”). 
 58. Kessler, supra note 6, at 383–84 (stating that one-third of families with children under 
eighteen are single parent households). 
 59. See Dixon, supra note 13, at 572 (noting that grandmothers, aunts, and friends who have 
historically provided daycare are no longer able to); Gershuny, supra note 52, at 201 (“In a highly 
mobile society, the mothers, aunts, grandmothers, and other female relatives, once available for help, 
are often miles away.”). 
 60. See generally Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 15–17 
(explaining the importance of face time in employee evaluations). 
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part, at home but their employers require full-time hours at work.  Other 
caregiving employees might be very productive and efficient but are 
valued primarily for the time spent at work.61  Many companies use face-
time as a proxy for productivity and talent because they lack a system of 
formal evaluation or the evaluations are based on subjective criteria, like 
popularity.62  Thus, even for employees not constrained by strict 
attendance policies, the “full-time, face-time norm”63 makes it difficult 
for working caregivers to balance work and family. 
The second workplace norm that makes it very difficult for 
caregivers to succeed in the workplace is required overtime.  Studies 
indicate that “[n]inety-five percent of mothers aged twenty-five to forty-
four with school-aged children at home work less than fifty hours a 
week.”64  Employers, especially in many of the professions, often require 
more than fifty hours per week, making it easy to see how most mothers 
cannot meet this ideal-worker norm.65  Because many women in these 
types of jobs are married to men in high-powered, high-demand 
careers,66 it is obvious how this overtime norm becomes very difficult for 
working parents.  Even if the parents are wealthy enough to employ a 
full-time nanny, many mothers are uncomfortable delegating away most 
of the childcare.67  With even an average commute of thirty minutes each 
way, a fifty-hour-per-week schedule would have the parent separated 
from the children for eleven hours per day.68  It is easy to see how this 
type of schedule would be undesirable for most primary caregivers.  
Women who choose to not work overtime also pay a price, not in 
excessive time away from their children, but in career costs.69  
Employees who do not meet the ideal-worker overtime norm will often 
receive lower, or no, bonuses or raises and will be passed up for 
promotion and advancement.70  This is especially true in occupations that 
                                                     
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally Travis, The Full-Time, Face-Time Norm, supra note 11. 
 64. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 177. 
 65. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 2. 
 66. Id. at 71–72. 
 67. Id. at 124. 
 68. See id. at 53.  But see Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 10 (stating that employees are not 
working this much and in fact, the average worker spends 9.2 hours away from home between work 
and commuting).  Although these authors do note that college educated employees work more hours 
than the 9.2 average.  Id. at 11. 
 69. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 54. 
 70. Id. at 59.  Some women might even get fired for refusing to work overtime.  In Upton v. 
JWP Businessland, the plaintiff, a divorced single mother, was fired after she informed her employer 
she would not be able to work the hours the employer required—8:15 a.m. until 10:00 p.m., Monday 
through Saturday—because of her parental responsibilities.  682 N.E.2d 1357, 1358 (Mass. 1997). 
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rely on billable hours, including lawyers, accountants, and others.71  
Therefore, the overtime norm is another way the caregiver conundrum 
manifests itself for working parents and other caregivers. 
Finally, caregivers in some careers are disadvantaged because of 
expectations of travel or relocation, or both.72  Because working mothers 
are still overwhelmingly the primary caregivers of their children, 
frequent travel obligations for work put an increased strain on their 
families.73  Accordingly, many women avoid travel obligations,74 either 
because their spouses essentially forbid their travel, or they feel too 
guilty to leave their spouses and children fending for themselves.  These 
days, many more jobs require travel, so a caregiver who is unwilling to 
travel or puts limitations on travel will likely find job and promotion 
opportunities limited.75  Similarly, many women are not in a position to 
relocate because of their spouse’s career.  While this trend is changing 
slightly, it is still the case that many more women leave their jobs, 
homes, and communities to follow their husbands than the reverse.76  A 
workplace that creates a norm of being willing and able to relocate in 
order to achieve success will inevitably discriminate against female 
caregivers.77  A recent example of this issue arose in Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc.,78 a class action lawsuit against Wal-Mart.  One of the 
requirements for management promotions at Wal-Mart was the 
willingness to move around within the company to different geographical 
areas.79  Because women are less able to move for their jobs, the 
plaintiffs challenged this neutral job requirement under a disparate- 
 
                                                     
 71. See HOLLY ENGLISH, GENDER ON TRIAL: SEXUAL STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE 
BALANCE IN THE LEGAL WORKPLACE 197 (2003) (noting a survey of associate lawyers that showed 
they were willing to accept smaller salaries and bonuses if they could work fewer hours). 
 72. See Williams, supra note 2 (discussing cases where women were discriminated against 
based on such expectations). 
 73. Of course, many women with children are willing to travel and yet are presumed unwilling 
because of their caregiving responsibilities.  See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 177–78 
(discussing a benevolent stereotyping case where an employer assumed a working mother would be 
unwilling to travel). 
 74. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 355 (stating that caregivers are sometimes unable to 
travel for work). 
 75. See Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 122 (citing testimony of an employee who said few 
women in the upper ranks of the organization have children due partly to the high travel demands). 
 76. See Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 20 (discussing 
studies that indicate that most women provide support for their husbands’ careers). 
 77. When I was in private practice, one employer evaluated employees based on a five-point 
scale, and only employees who were willing and able to relocate achieved five points. 
 78. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 79. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 183. 
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impact theory.80  This lawsuit is further evidence of how a relocation 
norm contributes to the caregiver conundrum. 
B. Caregivers Who Need More Financial Support 
The caregiver conundrum is even more pronounced for lower-
income workers, including many single mothers.81  They often do not 
have the financial means for adequate, reliable daycare,82 which makes it 
more difficult for them to perform as ideal workers and to comply with 
their employers’ stringent attendance policies.83  The lower-paying 
positions are also the least likely to offer any type of leave benefits, and 
these employees are much less likely to be entitled to FMLA leave.84  
This is because either they work for employers that are too small to be 
covered by the statute or the employees have not worked for the 
employer long enough to be eligible for FMLA leave.85  Even if 
employees are entitled to FMLA leave, many cannot afford to take a 
leave of absence because these leaves are often unpaid.86 
In addition to inadequate leave policies, many employees in the 
lower-income brackets are not working enough to make ends meet.87  
Many of the suggested proposals to remedy caregiver discrimination 
involve allowing caregivers to work fewer hours.88  These proposals are 
not helpful to caregivers who are working in low-paying, part-time 
positions.  These employees need better full-time jobs with better pay, 
benefits, and other types of financial support.89  Some of the suggested 
proposals to help these lower-income workers include: more protection 
                                                     
 80. See id. (discussing Dukes v. Wal-Mart).  For a discussion of the disparate-impact theory, 
see infra Part III.A. 
 81. See Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 12 (noting a “sharp increase in the percentage of single 
mothers who are in the labor market”); see also EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 5 
(stating that the work and family conflicts are felt most profoundly by lower-income workers).  See 
generally O’Leary, supra note 52. 
 82. Dixon, supra note 13, at 572–73. 
 83. EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that many lower-income workers 
cannot afford childcare). 
 84. O’Leary, supra note 52, at 7 (stating that 75% of lower-wage women do not have sick leave 
and 40% have no paid leave at all). 
 85. Id. at 7–8; see infra Part III.C. 
 86. The FMLA does not require paid leave, only unpaid leave, so it is in the employer’s 
discretion whether to pay for such leave.  Selmi, supra note 19, at 580; Selmi & Cahn, supra note 
25, at 16. 
 87. See Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 12 (noting that many lower-income employees are 
unable to trade hours for salary). 
 88. Id. at 19. 
 89. Id. 
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for part-time employees, national daycare, longer school days and years, 
additional coverage of the FMLA, and paid sick days and leaves of 
absence.90  The bottom line: narrowly-tailored, piecemeal reforms will 
not work to remedy the conundrum for all caregivers.  Some employees 
need and want more flexible schedules or the ability to work reduced 
hours; some employees need to work more hours or need more paid 
leave or financial assistance with daycare costs; and some employees 
need something in the middle.  Thus, this Article is aimed at using the 
communitarian theory to justify broad protection to include all caregivers 
who struggle to balance work and family the best they can.91 
C. Discrimination Based on Stereotypes 
Not all caregiving employees are harmed because of their inability to 
meet their employer’s demands.  Some employees, through supportive 
friends and family networks, or great nannies, manage to meet the ideal-
worker norm.  Yet these employees might also suffer from the caregiver 
conundrum when they are disadvantaged by their employers’ 
stereotypical beliefs regarding their work performance and 
commitment.92 
One study reviewing the stereotypes involving family caregivers in 
the workplace compared women on two axes: “competence” and 
“warmth.”93  Participants rated “‘career women’ as low in warmth but 
high in competence, similar to ‘career men’ and ‘millionaires.’”94  In 
contrast, “‘housewives’ were rated as high in warmth but low in 
competence, close to . . . the ‘blind,’ ‘disabled,’ ‘retarded,’ and 
‘elderly.’”95  When a woman becomes a mother, she may find herself 
perceived more as “a low-competence caregiver rather than as a high-
competence business woman.”96  As an example, one female attorney 
reported that she was given paralegal-type work when she returned from 
maternity leave, even though, in her words, “[she] had a baby, not a 
lobotomy.”97 
                                                     
 90. Id. at 18–19; see infra Part V. 
 91. See infra Part IV. 
 92. See O’Leary, supra note 52, at 60; Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 90.  Furthermore, as 
stated earlier, even if caregivers are managing to perform as ideal workers, doing so often comes at a 
cost to either their families or their emotional well-being. 
 93. Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 90. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 90–91 (quoting Deborah L. Rhodes, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 
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In addition, women may be stereotyped by those trying to be helpful 
to the caregiving workers.98  This is known as “benevolent 
stereotyping.”99  For instance, some managers might not consider 
mothers for jobs that require travel or a great deal of overtime, and when 
challenged, they would defend such decisions as being thoughtful or 
considerate of the mothers’ responsibilities.100  Consider the following 
example: 
[A]fter a husband and wife who worked for the same employer had a 
baby, the wife was sent home at 5:30 P.M., with the solicitous 
sentiment that she should be at home with the child.  In sharp contrast, 
the husband was given extra work and was expected to stay late.  The 
additional work was meant to be helpful, for the husband now had a 
family to support.101 
Regardless of whether the stereotyping is meant to be harmful or helpful, 
it deprives a woman of the power to make these decisions for herself.102 
Lawsuits challenging this type of discrimination exemplify the 
severity of the problem.103  In one case, the plaintiff-mother testified that 
the vice-president of a company had repeatedly asked “how her husband 
was managing given she was not home to cook for him, how work was 
going in light of her new child, and whether she could perform her job 
effectively after having a second child.”104  The vice-president told her 
that he preferred “unmarried, childless women because they would give 
150% to the job.”105 
In another case, a vice-president told the plaintiff-mother that he 
“would not give her the promotion because she was married, pregnant, 
                                                                                                                       
588 (1996)). 
 98. Id.; see Kathryn Abrams, Ideology & Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761, 782 (1990) 
(stating that “women feel pulled between an ideology of ‘neutrality,’” teaching them that they can be 
as good as their male counterparts and achieve the ideal career, and an “ideology of domesticity,” 
teaching them that a self-centered career can and will take a toll on the lives of their family). 
 99. Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to Gender 
Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2003). 
 100. Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 91. 
 101. Id. at 95–96 (citations omitted). 
 102. Id. at 95; see also EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 17–18 (describing a 
hypothetical where a boss assigns a new caregiver smaller accounts so she could better handle her 
new caregiving responsibilities). 
 103. I mention these cases to indicate the prevalence of managers using stereotypes to make 
employment decisions that negatively affect working caregivers.  I do not mean to suggest that the 
law is inadequate to take care of these types of stereotyping cases; in fact, I assert the opposite.  See 
infra Part III.A. 
 104. Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 125 (citing Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. 
Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55–58 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
 105. Id. (quoting Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 51). 
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and a mother and he believed she should stay at home caring for her 
family.”106  In yet another case, the plaintiff-caregiver “was told that she 
was not considered for a promotion because the new management 
position required extensive traveling, and it was assumed that she would 
not be interested because of her family obligations.”107  The senior vice-
president commented to the plaintiff “‘about the incompetence and 
laziness of women who are also working mothers,’ and also noted that 
women are not good planners, especially women with kids.”108  Another 
executive stated “that working mothers cannot be both good mothers and 
good workers, saying ‘I don’t see how you can do either job well.’”109 
Two recent cases further demonstrate how employers discriminate 
by making decisions based on stereotypical beliefs, rather than reality. In 
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District,110 the plaintiff 
was a school psychologist who was told by her supervisors that it was 
not possible to do the job with little children at home.111  She was denied 
tenure based on the assumption that she would not continue to work hard 
once she obtained tenure.112  In another case, Lust v. Sealy, Inc.,113 the 
plaintiff was an ambitious, successful salesperson who had repeatedly 
expressed her desire to be promoted.114  Nevertheless, her supervisor 
denied her promotion to a management position based on the belief that, 
because she had children, she would be unwilling to move.115  These 
types of cases exemplify the discrimination facing caregivers even when 
they are meeting the ideal-worker norm. 
As is clear from the above discussion, the caregiver conundrum 
includes all of the employer norms, policies, and actions that 
disadvantage and discriminate against caregivers in the workplace—both 
real workers and ideal workers.  The next part will discuss why current 
laws have proven inadequate in resolving the caregiver conundrum for 
real workers. 
                                                     
 106. Id. at 126 (citing Moore v. Ala. State Univ., 980 F. Supp. 426, 431 (M.D. Ala. 1997)).  
“Moreover, [the vice-president] declared, looking at her pregnant belly: ‘I was going to put you in 
charge of that office, but look at you now.’”  Id. (quoting Moore, 980 F. Supp. at 431). 
 107. Id. at 127 (citing Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998)). 
 108. Id. (citing Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *5). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 111. Id. at 114–15. 
 112. Id. at 115. 
 113. 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 114. Id. at 583. 
 115. Id. 
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III. INADEQUACY OF CURRENT LAW 
No federal statute explicitly prohibits discrimination against working 
adults with caregiving responsibilities,116 and only a few states provide 
any explicit protections.117  While there may be several possible laws 
caregivers could use to challenge discrimination by their employers,118 
arguably three main prohibitions are most often used: Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination, the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, and the FMLA.119  Despite these legal protections, this part will 
demonstrate that these laws have done little to remedy the caregiver 
conundrum for real workers.120 
A. Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964121 states that it is unlawful 
to discriminate based on sex, as well as other protected categories, 
including race, color, religion, and national origin.122  The main difficulty 
with using Title VII to challenge employment decisions that 
disadvantage caregivers is that Title VII follows the equal-treatment 
doctrine of assimilation, whereby an employer must treat women and 
men alike only if the women are similarly situated to the men.123  Of 
course the problem, which is well recognized by many scholars, is that 
men and women are not alike.124  First and most obviously, only women 
can get pregnant, give birth, recover from childbirth, and possibly 
breastfeed their children.  More importantly, however, men and women 
                                                     
 116. EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 1. 
 117. Williams, supra note 99, at 2–3 (2003) (discussing statutes passed in Alaska and 
Washington, D.C.). 
 118. See, e.g., Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 122–23 (pointing to ten viable theories 
available for plaintiffs who are suffering from caregiver discrimination). 
 119. See EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 1, 10, 21–22 (describing common 
ways employers can be liable for caregiver discrimination). 
 120. Kessler, supra note 6, at 374–75 (discussing the inadequacy of the laws’ ability to deal with 
women’s cultural caregiving). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 122. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”). 
 123. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the 
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1142, 1180 n.244 (1986) (explaining the equality 
doctrine); Littleton, supra note 26, at 1301–02 (1987) (stating that under some government models 
of equal treatment, “women merit equal treatment only so far as they can demonstrate that they are 
similar to men”).  For more discussion of this topic, see infra Part IV.A. 
 124. Finley, supra note 123, at 1142–43; Littleton, supra note 26, at 1295. 
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are not similarly situated when it comes to child rearing—women still 
perform the vast majority of child care and home-making duties.125  This 
fact often allows employers to get away with treating women differently, 
or worse, than men.  Accordingly, many scholars have criticized Title 
VII as being an ineffective tool to address caregiver discrimination.126 
While there has been an increase in the number of successful cases 
filed by caregivers,127 none of them involve caregivers who are real 
workers, i.e., caregivers who were not meeting the ideal-worker norm.  
While some scholars believe that hope exists on the litigation front, the 
cases often cited involve women who are meeting the ideal-worker norm.  
For instance, in Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., a woman lawyer sued her 
employer after she was repeatedly passed over for a promotion after 
having children, despite her history of excellent evaluations.128  
Following the “sex-plus”129 precedent of Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp.,130 the district court held that the plaintiff had stated a prima facie 
case despite the fact that the person given the position was also a woman, 
as long as the other woman did not also share the same “plus” 
characteristic—here, having school-aged children.131  She also could 
prove sex-plus discrimination by comparing mothers to fathers, because 
the employer had considered fathers with school-aged children for the 
position.132  The other type of cases that are likely to be successful is 
                                                     
 125. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 48–54 (discussing how American women 
still feel pressured to stay home to take care of their children); Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security 
Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1983, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 53–54 
(2004) (stating that the majority of people who take leave under FMLA policies are women); 
Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 174. 
 126. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 52, at 10 (stating that Title VII did nothing to accommodate 
women’s and men’s roles as caregivers); Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 78 n.10 (citing to other 
authors who believe that Title VII will be ineffective in remedying the problem of work and family 
conflict). 
 127. Williams, supra note 2. 
 128. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998).  For an analysis of this case, 
see WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 101–02. 
 129. See generally Kessler, supra note 6, at 391–92, 401 (discussing the sex-plus theory and the 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. case).  Kessler notes that the plaintiff in Phillips was successful 
because she challenged a policy that refused the hiring of any woman with preschool aged children 
but allowed the hiring of similarly situated men.  Id. at 391–92.  Kessler points out that courts have 
since interpreted the sex-plus claim to be actionable only if the “plus” is either “a fundamental right 
or an immutable characteristic.”  Id. at 392.  Because having children was considered a fundamental 
right, the claim succeeded in Phillips.  Id. at 400–01.  However, because society believes a woman’s 
caregiving role is freely chosen, there have been no reported cases where the plaintiff has argued or a 
court has found that a woman’s status as a primary caregiver is an immutable characteristic.  See id. 
at 401–02. 
 130. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 131. Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at **18–19. 
 132. Id. at **16–21. 
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where managers make explicit comments that indicate that the reason for 
an adverse employment decision is the fact that a woman is about to have 
or already has children.133 
For real caregivers, however, litigation is not as promising of an 
option.134  The reason these lawsuits fail depends upon the type of claim 
the woman brings.  Assume a woman with children does not get 
promoted to the next level in her company.  If she brings a disparate-
treatment sex discrimination claim alleging that she was treated 
differently because of her caregiving responsibilities,135 the equal-
treatment theory requires that she prove that the other employees who 
were promoted were similarly situated to her.136  However, if she is like 
many caregivers, she might not have worked as much as the employee 
who was promoted;137 therefore, she will struggle to meet her burden of 
proof. 
Alternatively, if she brings a disparate-impact suit, her claim will 
similarly fail.  A disparate-impact claim does not require that the plaintiff 
prove intentional discrimination, but rather that a characteristic-neutral 
policy or practice has a disproportionately negative effect on a particular 
class; here, the class is women.138  It is easy to see why disparate-impact 
claims could have great potential for challenging many of the workplace 
policies that make it difficult for caregivers to succeed.139  Because 
women bear a disproportionate burden of caregiving, stringent workplace 
policies regarding hours, attendance, and face-time will likely have a 
disproportionate effect on women.140  Accordingly, courts could use the 
disparate-impact theory to require employers to restructure existing 
workplace policies that disproportionately disadvantage women.141 
                                                     
 133. See cases cited supra notes 104–09. 
 134. See generally Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 122–61 (discussing the outcomes of 
some of these types of cases). 
 135. This is called a “sex-plus” case.  See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age 
Discrimination: Protecting Older Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 84–87 (2003) (discussing the 
history of the “sex-plus” discrimination doctrine). 
 136. Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  But 
see EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 8 (stating that comparative evidence is not 
necessary). 
 137. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 71. 
 138. Id. at 105. 
 139. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 37 (“Because this 
model focuses on inequitable results and does not require discriminatory intent by the employer, this 
model holds great potential for addressing aspects of women’s inequality that stem from workplace 
organizational norms that create, retrench, or magnify women’s disproportionate conflicts between 
work and family.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 140. See id. at 37–39. 
 141. See id. at 38. 
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However, when bringing these claims, women are likely to face three 
inter-related obstacles: (1) compiling the requisite statistics to show that 
the policy has a disparate impact on women;142 (2) identifying a specific 
policy or practice that caused the adverse employment decision;143 and 
(3) rebutting the employer’s defense that the policy is justified by 
business necessity.144  Because long hours and overtime are the status 
quo at many companies, an attempt to change the status quo through 
litigation will be met with substantial resistance.145 
The only cases that are likely to be successful under Title VII are 
those in which the mother performs as an ideal worker, but is 
nevertheless discriminated against because of stereotypical beliefs 
regarding women’s traditional roles.146  As already discussed, the 
                                                     
 142. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 106; see also Kessler, supra note 6, 
at 415–16 (discussing the difficulty of proving the statistical disparities). 
 143. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 106; Kessler, supra note 6, at 413 
(noting that “[w]hile there are many identifiable, affirmative employer practices that serve to 
disadvantage women in the workplace, they are so entrenched, so accepted as the norm, that they are 
virtually invisible”); O’Leary, supra note 52, at 37; see also Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 
223 F.3d 579, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a rigid work schedule and no-absence policy 
were not employment “practices” that could form the basis for a disparate-impact suit but were 
instead just requirements of the job).  Professor Travis has argued that if judges were following a 
“transformative approach” to disparate-impact law under Title VII, they would distinguish a job’s 
required tasks from the norms dictating when and where the tasks have to be completed.  The courts 
could then see these norms as an employment practice subject to disparate-impact review.  Travis, 
Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 39.  She notes, however, that most 
judges do not distinguish between actual job tasks and the norms regarding when and where work is 
to be performed, thereby defeating many disparate-impact claims.  Id. (“Under this approach, a 
woman who experiences disproportionate conflicts between work and family as a result of a default 
workplace structure will have no cognizable target for her disparate impact claim, which requires the 
plaintiff to challenge a particular employment practice.”). 
 144. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 106–07; Kessler, supra note 6, at 416–
17. 
 145. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 40–46 (discussing cases 
where disparate impact claims were not successful); see generally Kessler, supra note 6.  However, 
Professor Travis believes that the disparate-impact theory has some potential to be a useful tool to 
challenge employment practices that demand “full-time, face-time.”  Travis, Recapturing the 
Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 83 (describing how the United Kingdom has had success 
challenging the full-time, face-time norm by using a theory similar to the disparate impact theory in 
the United States).  Travis uses the United Kingdom model to demonstrate how it is possible to use 
the disparate-impact theory to challenge workplace policies that disproportionately disadvantage 
female caregivers.  Id.  Specifically, employees in the United Kingdom have had better success 
disputing that inflexible work policies are practices upon which a disparate impact suit can be 
brought, making it more difficult for employers to satisfy the business necessity defense.  See id.  
Furthermore, Travis points out that disparate impact litigation can have positive effects, including 
changing institutional practices and prompting new legislation. Id. at 84; see also Williams & 
Bornstein, supra note 4, at 186 (discussing the positive impact on institutional practices because of 
the threat of litigation). 
 146. See cases cited supra notes 103–114.  See generally, EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra 
note 12; Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 365 (2004); Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using 
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caregiving responsibilities of many mothers prevent them from 
performing as ideal workers; therefore, litigation using Title VII is an 
unpromising option.147 
Even though most scholars agree that Title VII is not the most 
effective tool for remedying caregiver discrimination, in May 2007, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued 
Enforcement Guidance “regarding unlawful disparate treatment under 
the federal [Equal Employment Opportunity] laws of workers with 
caregiving responsibilities.”148  The EEOC recognized that while there is 
no federal law prohibiting discrimination against caregivers per se, there 
are many circumstances where discrimination against caregivers might 
constitute unlawful discrimination based on protected characteristics 
under Title VII and other statutes.149 
The EEOC Caregiver Guidance puts a great deal of emphasis on the 
stereotyping theory.  For instance, many of the examples used by the 
EEOC are situations where the woman met her employer’s expectations 
but was nevertheless treated unfavorably based on her employer’s 
stereotypical belief that the woman’s caregiving responsibilities would 
interfere with her performance.150  The EEOC emphasizes: 
 Although women actually do assume the bulk of caretaking 
responsibilities in most families and many women do curtail their work 
responsibilities when they become caregivers, Title VII does not permit 
employers to treat female workers less favorably merely on the gender-
based assumption that a particular female worker will assume 
caretaking responsibilities or that a female worker’s caretaking 
responsibilities will interfere with her work performance.151 
However, consistent with the argument made above that only ideal 
workers are protected from discrimination, the EEOC notes that 
                                                                                                                       
Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 287 (2003). 
 147. See Kessler, supra note 6, at 407–08 (noting that plaintiffs are much less successful in cases 
where the plaintiffs’ direct requests or their employment records reveal that they require an 
accommodation for family obligations).  Kessler also states: “Before they are employed . . . women 
[can] succeed[] in convincing courts that they can conform to the male-worker norm.”  Id. at 407.  
This is why the stereotypical cases succeed.  But if the women fail at juggling it all, which inevitably 
many will, “[they] are penalized . . . for failing to conform or are disadvantaged vis-à-vis coworkers 
without caregiving responsibilities . . . [and] Title VII and the . . . formal equality [mode] on which it 
is based offers little protection.”  Id. at 407; see also Kaminer, supra note 9, at 328 (stating that Title 
VII provides little help for working mothers who need accomodation of their parenting obligations). 
 148. EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12. 
 149. Id. at 1. 
 150. See generally id. 
 151. Id. at 11. 
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employment decisions based on the employee’s actual performance, such 
as missing work because of childcare problems, do not violate Title VII, 
even if the employee’s deficiencies result from caregiving 
responsibilities.152  In other words, Title VII is most effective for 
challenging discrimination against caregivers who perform as ideal 
workers and not nearly as effective for challenging the institutional 
norms and practices that make it difficult for caregivers to perform as 
ideal workers.153 
The EEOC also warns employers about unlawful stereotyping based 
on pregnancy, i.e., assuming an employee will not be capable of, or 
should not be performing certain tasks, or, alternatively, unlawfully 
refusing to modify duties for pregnant women.154  The EEOC further 
discusses the discrimination that hurts male caregivers, where employers 
have denied men the opportunity to be caregivers for their kids.155  
Finally, the EEOC discusses discrimination against caregivers because of 
race and national origin, unlawful stereotyping based on association with 
an individual with a disability, hostile work environment claims, and 
retaliation claims.156  While the EEOC Guidance reveals the breadth of 
the types of discrimination caregivers might experience, as well as the 
legal claims they might bring, it does not address the types of 
institutional practices that make it very difficult for real workers to 
balance their caregiving responsibilities with their careers. 
B. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
As should be obvious from the title of this statute, which was an 
amendment to Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)157 
                                                     
 152. Id. at 16. 
 153. Kaminer, supra note 9, at 329.  For instance, Title VII is ineffective at challenging the norm 
of full-time work.  There is no requirement under Title VII that employers allow employees to work 
part-time or reduced hours.  Kessler, supra note 3, at 326.  Title VII only requires that if an employer 
allows some caregivers to work part-time, it must not discriminate based on a protected 
classification when allowing part-time schedules.  Williams, supra note 2. 
 154. EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 9–10, 22. 
 155. Id. at 24. 
 156. Id. at 25–31. 
 157. The PDA reads: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability 
to work . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
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only protects women who are pregnant or who are recovering from 
childbirth.158  Furthermore, the PDA only requires employers to treat 
pregnant employees in the same way they would treat other employees 
similar in their ability or inability to work.159  In other words, a small 
employer who is not covered by the FMLA160 would not be required to 
provide any leave to pregnant employees as long as the employer 
similarly denies leave to an employee who, perhaps, breaks an arm or leg 
and cannot work for several weeks.161  Many women only get one or two 
weeks to recover from childbirth before they are expected to return to 
work, and, if a small employer chooses to, it can deny any leave at all for 
the birth of a woman’s baby.162  While there have been some successful 
claims brought under the PDA, they tend to encompass situations where 
a woman gets pregnant and the employer fires or otherwise discriminates 
against her based on the stereotypical belief that she is no longer capable 
of being a productive employee or that she will not return to work after 
her maternity leave.163  Of course, since a great deal of the caregiver 
conundrum occurs after childbirth and before the child leaves for college, 
it is easy to see why the PDA does not provide adequate protection for 
caregivers.164 
                                                     
 158. Id.; see also Kessler, supra note 6, at 397–99 (discussing the limitations of the PDA—
namely, that it only covers the immediate physical benefits of pregnancy and childbirth and does not 
provide any remedy for a woman who needs to nurse her baby or needs time off to care for a 
newborn). 
 159. § 2000e(k); see also O’Leary, supra note 52, at 58–59 (stating that the PDA is not 
comprehensive because it only requires an employer to give leave benefits for pregnancy if it does so 
for other injuries). 
 160. See infra Part III.C. 
 161. See EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 11; see also Kessler, supra note 6, at 
395 (stating that employers can treat pregnant employees as badly as they treat other non-pregnant 
employees). 
 162. This is true only if the employer would deny a leave of absence to other employees for 
other short-term illnesses or injuries.  Indeed, “Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they 
treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees.”  Kessler, supra note 6, at 395 (quoting Troupe 
v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
 163. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Donler Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
manager’s comments of “[o]h my God, she’s pregnant again” and “you’re not coming back after this 
baby” were direct evidence of discrimination). 
 164. See Kessler, supra note 6, at 398; O’Leary, supra note 52, at 35–36 (noting that the PDA 
only applies to medical leave and not caregiving leave); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 172–
73 (noting that many plaintiffs’ attorneys initially filed suit under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
but these lawsuits were unsuccessful because the PDA does not protect new mothers).  But see Susan 
E. Huhta, Elizabeth S. Westfall, & Joan C. Williams, Looking Forward and Back: Using the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Discriminatory Gender/Pregnancy Stereotyping to Challenge 
Discrimination Against New Mothers, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 304 (2003) (arguing that 
the PDA can be used to challenge discriminatory decisions against new mothers based on past 
pregnancies). 
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C. The Family and Medical Leave Act 
Enacted in 1993, the FMLA165 was thought to be a major benefit for 
working caregivers.  Reports differ regarding the impetus for passing the 
FMLA.  Some believe the gender neutrality of the statute (allowing both 
men and women to take caregiving leave) was necessary in order to 
ensure women’s equality in the workplace by resolving the stigma 
associated with only allowing women to take such leaves.166  However, 
despite the neutrality of the law, others believe that the need to 
accommodate motherhood was the primary force behind the passage of 
the statute.167  Despite the divergence of opinions regarding how and why 
the FMLA was passed, most agree that the FMLA has provided only 
limited benefits to a limited group of workers.168 
First of all, only employers with fifty or more employees within a 
seventy-five mile radius are covered by the FMLA.169  This requirement 
has a disproportionate effect on lower-income women who are more 
likely to be employed by small employers that are not required to provide 
any leave under the FMLA.170  Second, the FMLA defines eligible 
employees to include only those who have worked for more than one 
year for the company and have worked 1,250 or more hours in the past 
twelve months.171  “These conditions, taken together, effectively limit the 
Act’s application to a minority of women workers, since women are 
more likely than men to work for small businesses, to work part-time, to 
work in occupations with little job security, and to interrupt their careers 
due to family responsibilities.”172  Almost forty percent of all employees  
 
                                                     
 165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006). 
 166. Grossman, supra note 125, at 44 (2004); Kessler, supra note 6, at 419; see also O’Leary, 
supra note 52, at 40 (discussing the history of the FMLA and the concern regarding how it was 
classified—an accommodation statute was viewed negatively because of fear that it would make 
women more expensive to hire). 
 167. Grossman, supra note 125, at 43 (discussing the emphasis during the FMLA hearings on 
the importance of mother-baby bonding). 
 168. Gershuny, supra note 52, at 201 (noting that other scholars have pointed to the inadequacy 
of the FMLA in resolving the majority of conflicts between child-rearing and work).  Some state 
laws provide better protection and benefits than the FMLA, but the problems mentioned here still 
exist. 
 169. § 2611(4)(A). 
 170. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 22; see also GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 46, at 19 (noting 
that it is usually large employers who are willing to provide benefits that cost money, such as paid 
leave); O’Leary, supra note 52, at 43 (noting that more than one half of low-wage workers are 
employed by small employers). 
 171. § 2611(2)(A). 
 172. Kessler, supra note 6, at 422. 
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either work for employers not covered by the FMLA or are themselves 
not eligible for FMLA leave.173 
The FMLA’s inadequacies are even more pronounced for lower-
income workers.  One-third of single parents and low-income workers 
have been employed for less than one year and are therefore not covered 
by the Act.174  Because of all of the limitations mentioned above, the vast 
majority of lower-income employees are not covered by the FMLA.175  
Another problem with the statute is that it only provides for unpaid 
leave, not paid leave.176  Many women who need maternity leave or leave 
to care for a sick child cannot afford to take it because they cannot afford 
to live without their income.177  Thus, it is easy to see that this statute, 
which certainly was a step in the right direction, nevertheless offers little 
assistance to lower-income workers.178 
A further limitation of the FMLA is that it only provides leave for 
certain enumerated reasons, including: 
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in 
order to care for such son or daughter. 
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee 
for adoption or foster care. 
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the 
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health 
condition. 
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee 
unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.179 
                                                     
 173. Grossman, supra note 125, at 37 (stating that almost forty percent of employees are either 
ineligible or employed by an employer who is not large enough to be a covered entity under the 
FMLA).  To make matters worse, one study indicates that eighteen to twenty-one percent of all 
employers who are covered under the FMLA do not comply with it.  GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 
46, at 17. 
 174. O’Leary, supra note 52, at 43–45. 
 175. Id. at 45 (explaining that “restrictions on employer and employee coverage 
disproportionately fall on the low-wage workforce”). 
 176. § 2612(c). 
 177. See O’Leary, supra note 52, at 45 (stating that seventy-five percent of employees reported 
not being able to afford to take leave); Selmi, supra note 19, at 580 (emphasizing the problems with 
the lack of paid sick leave); Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 16 (stating that in results from two 
surveys of reasons for not taking leave, “by far the lartest category . . . was an inability to afford to 
leave”). 
 178. Gershuny, supra note 52, at 202 (noting that lower-income parents are more likely to be 
fired when they miss work for childcare reasons than higher-income parents). 
 179. § 2612(a)(1). 
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The FMLA offers “no protection for the types of routine childcare 
obligations and contingencies that most commonly conflict with work 
requirements.”180  Accordingly, the FMLA is an incomplete solution.181 
Finally, despite the gender-neutral language of the statute, many 
believe that the FMLA actually harms women because it has done 
nothing to change the leave-taking patterns of men and women.182  In 
other words, if women continue to take parenting leaves for either the 
birth of a child or to care for a child or parent with a serious health 
condition, employers will continue to have a disincentive to hire women 
because employers will view women as more expensive to employ.183  
Some believe that the main obstacle to equality for women is the 
reluctance of men to share in caregiving tasks,184 and the FMLA did not 
correct that problem.185  As Professor Grossman aptly stated: “no one 
ever called the law a victory for equality.”186  And the FMLA has also 
not been a victory for those with caregiving responsibilities.187 
Because current law has proven inadequate in remedying the 
disadvantages and discrimination faced by caregivers, reform is needed 
                                                     
 180. Smith, supra note 41, at 1444; see also Gershuny, supra note 52, at 201 (noting that the 
FMLA provides no leave for colds, flu, and pinkeye); Kessler, supra note 6, at 424 (noting all of the 
routine illnesses not covered by the FMLA, including the common cold, the flu, earaches, upset 
stomachs, minor ulcers, headaches, and routine dental or orthodontal problems). 
 181. Kessler, supra note 6, at 429.  As Kessler stated: 
But women’s typical caregiving responsibilities, i.e., caring for young but healthy 
children or elderly but not seriously ill parents; dealing with minor family illnesses; 
cooking and cleaning; transporting children or parents to routine medical appointments; 
and coping with unexpected family emergencies—all the work that women 
disproportionately and invisibly perform with the family—does not even register as a blip 
on the radar screen of the American legal system. 
Id. 
 182. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 125, at 18 (stating that the FMLA “promotes motherhood 
without promoting equal parenthood”). 
 183. Id. at 27, 47, 49; see also Ariel Meysam Ayanna, Aggressive Parental Leave Incentivizing: 
A Statutory Proposal Toward Gender Equalization in the Workplace, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
293, 297 (2007) (discussing costs employers anticipate when employing women); Dixon, supra note 
13, at 591 (same). 
 184. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 125, at 40 (stating that the statutory structure of the FMLA 
“does not account for the main obstacle to equality for working mothers—the reluctance of men to 
share caretaking tasks and draw on available leave to do so”); Selmi, supra note 19, at 595 (stating 
that although “men have access to leave [and] are not likely to suffer greater penalties than women 
for taking that leave . . . women continue to have overwhelming responsibility for life outside the 
workplace”). 
 185. See Grossman, supra note 125, at 58 (“Leave-taking data both before and after the FMLA 
was enacted shows that even after the removal of the state barriers to equality obstacles and even 
after imposition of statutory guarantees of job security, inequality persists.”). 
 186. Id. at 51. 
 187. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 357 (stating that the FMLA has been criticized for 
failing to address women’s caregiving needs). 
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and the reform must be comprehensive enough to protect all working 
caregivers.  Before the reform can be accomplished, however, we need to 
find a theoretical anchor to justify such comprehensive coverage—
protection of real, not just ideal, workers.  Part IV will accomplish this 
next step. 
IV. USING COMMUNITARIAN THEORY TO JUSTIFY COMPREHENSIVE 
REFORM 
As discussed above, the caregiver conundrum manifests itself in 
many ways, including: the struggle caregivers face when they try to 
balance work and family and continually find that something suffers, the 
discrimination in the workplace experienced by many caregivers when 
their parenting or other caregiving responsibilities make it difficult for 
them to perform as ideal workers, and discrimination against those who 
do perform as ideal workers, but are hindered by decisions based on 
stereotypes that presume otherwise.188  Parents and other caregivers 
should be respected and supported regardless of the decisions they make 
in balancing work and family.189  Some families will choose that one 
parent, usually the woman, does not work outside of the home.190  Some 
families need both parents, or a single parent, to work full-time and 
sometimes overtime and yet struggle with unpaid leaves of absence for 
childbirth or the illnesses of their children.  In some families, the mother 
wants or needs to work, or both, but prefers to have more time with her 
family than the typical full-time, face-time workplace norm will allow.  
Finally, some caregivers are forced into their caregiving roles because of 
the sudden illness, injury, or disability of a loved one.  Scholars have 
debated whether we should focus on achieving more balance for 
                                                     
 188. See supra Part II. 
 189. This statement is obviously overbroad.  I do not support a parent’s decision to completely 
neglect their children because of work responsibilities.  Young children should not be left alone and 
should be cared for and taken to the doctor (or hospital if necessary) when sick.  Other than serious 
neglect, however, I believe parents should be able to decide how they want to balance work and 
family and I support measures that will make more options possible.  See infra notes 334–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 190. I will admit to some ambivalence about this choice.  If a woman or a man makes a 
completely free choice to remain at home with children—a choice that is not constrained by social 
forces, pressure from a spouse, or the impression that it is impossible to successfully balance work 
and family, then I respect that choice.  It is my belief that some, but certainly not the majority, of 
stay-at-home moms have made such a free choice.  Even in these cases, however, the stay-at-home 
parent will have a working spouse, and it is still the case that the spouse might feel the caregiver 
conundrum when he or she wants to spend more time with his or her children than most workplaces 
will allow. 
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caregivers or trying to get women to work more.191  Scholars in favor of 
the latter approach believe that women will only achieve equality in the 
workplace if they work like men typically do, i.e., meeting the full-time, 
face-time norm.192  Because I believe that we do not have to choose 
between these two goals, I do not take sides in the debate.  We can 
support the choices of all caregivers (within reason, of course) and still 
achieve equality in the workplace.  We just need a change in perspective.  
This part provides that perspective. 
In order to support all of the choices of all caregivers, we need to 
define the caregiver conundrum broadly, to include real workers and not 
just ideal workers.  In other words, when we define which employer 
practices operate to disadvantage caregivers in the workplace, we need to 
include those workplace policies and norms that make it difficult for real 
caregivers to succeed in the workplace.  What does this mean in 
practice?  Certainly, this Article does not suggest that coworkers should 
offer to do caregivers’ jobs, either at work or at home.  Furthermore, this 
Article does not suggest that caregivers should be able to work whenever 
or how much they choose without having any employment 
consequences.193  Instead, this Article suggests that we should support 
informal attempts by employers, as well as formal law reform, aimed at 
lessening the burden of the caregiver conundrum.  All employees, 
employers,194 and society should support legislation that would provide 
                                                     
 191. See sources cited supra note 26. 
 192. See generally Dixon, supra note 13; Lester, supra note 20; Selmi, supra note 19. 
 193. See Selmi, supra note 19, at 576 (criticizing scholars who seem to be arguing that women 
should be able to do whatever they want with respect to balancing work and family without any 
penalty). 
 194. It might seem odd to suggest that employers should support efforts that will require them to 
change their workplace policies.  However, there is a wealth of scholarship demonstrating the 
financial benefits, in terms of decreased attrition and improved morale, of giving employees the tools 
necessary to balance work and family.  See EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 7–8 
(noting that there are benefits to employers in offering workplace flexibility); Williams & Segal, 
supra note 19, at 79; see also WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4.  One recent study by 
the Families & Work Institute found that employees in more flexible and effective workplaces were 
more likely to have greater engagement, higher levels of satisfaction, more loyalty, and less negative 
behavior.  GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 46, at 3.  In other words, flexible workplaces were 
beneficial to employers and employees.  The study also indicated that employers who offer generous 
caregiving leaves have less difficulty finding and hiring employees who are honest, reliable and 
hard-working self-starters.  Id. at 7.  But see Selmi, supra note 19, at 582–85 (disagreeing in part 
with the idea that family-friendly policies are beneficial to employers).  Selmi points out that there 
has not been enough good data to prove that having a family-friendly workplace benefits employers.  
Id. at 583.  He argues that employers might rightfully be concerned with an adverse selection 
problem, where too many employees who need flexible schedules or other benefits are attracted to a 
small number of employers who offer them, making them much less feasible.  Id. at 582.  Other 
possible reasons employers might not adopt flexible workplace policies, despite their apparent 
benefits, are concerns over cost or ambivalence about more women in the workplace.  Id. at 585; see 
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for paid leave or national daycare, or tax credits for employers willing to 
provide family-friendly workplaces, to name a few examples.195  And 
when an employer voluntarily assumes obligations to provide benefits 
that enable caregivers to better balance work and family, coworkers 
should support such measures instead of sabotaging them.196 
This Article is not the first to suggest that workplace reform should 
target the policies and norms that disadvantage caregivers who are not 
meeting the ideal-worker norm.197  But why have those previous attempts 
been unsuccessful?  The answer lies in the theoretical underpinnings of 
current law and prior proposals.198  There are two primary attacks that are 
likely to be levied against a proposal to include real workers when 
fashioning a remedy for the caregiver conundrum.  The first response to 
the problems faced by caregivers who are not ideal workers is one that 
places the blame on the “choices” the parent has made.199  Many 
employers, policy makers, and even some scholars, believe that our laws 
should only protect those who are performing as ideal workers and are 
being discriminated against despite their ideal-worker habits.200  The 
                                                                                                                       
also Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 380 (discussing reasons employers do not voluntarily 
accommodate employees’ caregiving needs). 
 195. For a discussion of all of the potential reforms see infra Part V. 
 196. I recognize that some employers could take this idea too far and allow all caregivers to 
work a reduced-hour schedule without hiring any additional employees, thereby putting an undue 
burden on the non-caregiving employees.  I personally believe that everyone has a right to balance in 
their lives, and smart employers will not reserve scheduling benefits for parents.  Professor Williams 
has also argued that employers should make reduced-hour schedules available to all employees, as 
long as they can present a viable plan for getting the job done, and as long as they are willing to take 
the reduced pay that goes along with the reduced schedule.  WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra 
note 4, at 86–88.  My experience anecdotally tells me that many non-parent employees claim to want 
a reduced-hour schedule but when push comes to shove, they are not willing to take the pay cut.  See 
also Selmi, supra note 19, at 579 (stating that while many men express an interest in trading salary 
for less time, they rarely do so); Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 12 (stating that few employees are 
willing to trade less income for more time).  But see Nancy Rankin, Phoebe Taubman & Yolanda 
Wu, Seeking a Just Balance: Law Students Weigh In on Work and Family, A BETTER BALANCE 3 
(June 2008) (surveying law students who overwhelmingly said they were willing to trade money for 
time in order to balance law practice with a family). 
 197. See generally WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4; Martha Albertson Fineman, 
Cracking the Foundational Myth: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (2000). 
 198. I am not the first to suggest that current theoretical frameworks do not adequately address 
the discrimination that occurs for those engaged in caregiving tasks.  For instance, Professor Kessler 
exposes the theoretical flaws that contribute to the law’s inability to address what she refers to as 
“cultural caregiving”—the caregiving that is not biologically based.  Kessler, supra note 6, at 430–
44.  She states that “our law’s foundational tenets of autonomy, equality, and rationality will be 
revisited here to make a specific argument about the law’s inability to recognize women’s cultural 
caregiving.”  Id. at 434. 
 199. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 6; Selmi, supra note 19, at 589. 
 200. See generally EEOC CAREGIVER GUIDANCE, supra note 12; Selmi, supra note 19, at 581–
82. 
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rationale of these commentators is that women who choose to have 
children and choose to not be ideal workers are choosing to not be 
similarly situated to their non-parent counterparts and therefore deserve 
to be treated differently.201  Moreover, some believe that these employees 
should be responsible for their choices, rather than passing the burden 
onto other workers, to employers, or to the public at large.202  The second 
criticism against a proposal to protect real workers is a concern over 
special-treatment stigma.  Scholars have spent quite some time 
disagreeing with one another about the appropriateness of providing any 
special benefits or accommodations203 to working mothers.204  Special-
treatment stigma occurs when employers have an incentive to hire fewer 
women or other employees who are perceived to or do need special 
accommodations in the workplace.205  The stigma also manifests itself in 
the resentment of other employees who do not receive any special 
treatment.206  As will be discussed below, neither of these criticisms are 
adequately addressed by commonly used theoretical frameworks.  
Accordingly, we need a new theoretical response to these criticisms.  
Communitarian theory provides that response. 
                                                     
 201. See Selmi, supra note 19, at 574–75 (discussing the view that women are choosing to drop 
out of workforce rather than being forced to leave).  Professor Kessler highlights the Law and 
Economics movement’s “rational choice theory” as being to blame for this line of thinking.  Kessler, 
supra note 6, at 441–42. 
 202. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 374–75 (noting that public assistance is viewed as 
charity and is therefore stigmatized).  Professor Arnow-Richman states: “[c]onsistent with the 
ideology of the industrial age, it was thought that every able-bodied (and implicitly male) person 
should be capable of providing for himself.” Id.  For further discussion see Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1421 (2001) (stating that many think a 
family’s need to resort to collective resources rather than caring for themselves is considered a 
failure and deserving of condemnation and stigma). 
 203. Another example of employees who need special accommodations in the workplace is 
individuals with disabilities.  Because the Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to 
provide reasonable accommodations in the workplace, employers sometimes refuse to hire 
employees who might need accommodations because of the real or perceived cost in providing those 
accommodations.  See Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 363–67 (discussing the ADA’s lack of 
success in challenging workplace norms). 
 204. See, e.g., Williams & Bornstein, supra note 4, at 173 (criticizing the accommodation 
model).  For a discussion of the equal-treatment versus special-treatment debate, see infra Part 
IV.B.1. 
 205. FRANCINE D. BLAU & RONALD G. EHRENBERG, Introduction, in GENDER AND FAMILY 
ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 4 (Francine D. Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997) (arguing that 
mandated leave policies increase costs to employers, which may lead them to pay women less or to 
not hire as many women to avoid the leave costs altogether); Grossman, supra note 125, at 47–49 
(discussing concerns that the FMLA would hurt women because mandated leave would make 
employers less willing to hire women). 
 206. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 392–93; Lester, supra note 20, at 43–44. 
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A. The Myth of the Caregiving Choice 
1. The Rhetoric of Choice 
As stated above, caregiving has not been adequately supported and 
protected in the workplace because many believe that parenting is a 
freely-made choice, and thus should be treated accordingly.207  Certainly, 
liberal theory takes this view.  Liberal theory emphasizes that we are all 
discrete, autonomous individuals, and the only job of the state is to keep 
people from intruding on one another’s liberty interests.208  Under liberal 
theory, the ways in which we are connected to each other become 
secondarily important to liberty.209  Attachments and obligations do not 
matter.210  Under this view, both the decision to have children, and the 
decision about how to balance work and family, are unconstrained 
choices made by parents.  Because the parent has the choice, the parent 
alone is responsible for the choice, and the market or the state should 
have nothing to do with the parent’s choice.211  As long as liberal theory 
defines parenthood and caregiving as a choice, the law allows employers 
to treat those who “choose” to become parents differently.212 
Similarly, Law & Economics’ “rational choice theory” emphasizes 
the choices parents and other caregivers make.213  Simply stated, rational 
choice theory posits that all humans are motivated by self interest and 
therefore, if a person engages in an action, it must be in her self 
interest.214  Accordingly, “[v]iewed through the lens of rational choice 
theory, women’s cultural caregiving is a mere choice, for which the state 
owes no support and employers owe no accommodation.”215 
Feminist legal theorists generally dispute the emphasis on autonomy 
and rational choice, recognizing that many decisions made by mothers 
                                                     
 207. Kessler, supra note 6, at 375 (“[T]he influence of rational choice theory . . . [has] served to 
construct women’s caregiving as a freely chosen endeavor that is undeserving of protection from 
discrimination within the workplace.”). 
 208. Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 150–51 (1998). 
 209. Id. at 151–52. 
 210. Id. at 152; see also Fineman, supra note 197, at 14 (stating that the “implications of the fact 
that individuals exist in family or relational contexts are largely ignored”). 
 211. See generally Fineman, supra note 197 (describing and critiquing this view of family). 
 212. Cf. Kessler, supra note 6, at 441–42 (explaining human choice under rational choice theory 
and that one’s choice to become a parent is owed no accommodation by the employer). 
 213. Id. at 441. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 442. 
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are not freely-made, unconstrained choices.216  For instance, Professor 
Martha Fineman questions whether it is fair to consider a woman’s 
choice in becoming a mother a fair choice.  Professor Fineman asks: 
when a woman chooses to become a mother, does this mean that she has 
consented to “the societal conditions attendant to that role and the many 
ways in which that status will negatively affect her economic 
prospects?”217  Furthermore, as some feminists have argued, you cannot 
separate parents from their attachment to their children.  Their 
parenthood is not just a choice—it is a responsibility and most parents 
define themselves at least in part by their role as parents.218  The 
responsibility of parenthood removes it from the rubric of a purely 
voluntary choice.  While deciding in the first instance to have children 
may be a voluntary choice, raising them well is not—it is a 
responsibility.  As one scholar aptly stated: 
Engaging in parenting responsibilities is . . . different from one’s choice 
of chocolate ice cream over vanilla; the latter is a choice based on taste, 
the former is a moral imperative based on one’s understanding of one’s 
self (conceived of in terms of one’s relationships), which stands 
independent of individual preferences.219 
However, despite this greater understanding of the autonomy myth, 
many feminists do not adequately address the caregiver conundrum 
because they do not consider all of the interests at stake.220  Specifically, 
their focus is more often on women’s equality in the workplace, rather 
than the value of children and raising them well.221  The feminist legal 
theory literature also has not given adequate attention to women in other 
caregiving roles.222  Communitarian theory, on the other hand, does 
respond to the rhetoric of choice. 
                                                     
 216. Id. at 445.  Professor Kessler discloses two feminist responses to the rhetoric of choice.  Id.  
The first response is “that women are neither autonomous nor rational decision makers, because 
biological forces dictate the inevitability of their role as nurturers.”  Id.  The second and prevailing 
response, however, is “that women are neither autonomous nor rational decision makers, because 
gender socialization greatly influences their decisions to take on caregiving responsibilities.”  Id. 
 217. Fineman, supra note 202, at 1420. 
 218. Eichner, supra note 208, at 153, 171. 
 219. Id. at 171–72. 
 220. See Kessler, supra note 6, at 377 (asserting that feminist responses have proven to be less 
capable of addressing the rhetoric of choice that legitimates discrimination against caregivers). 
 221. Eichner, supra note 208, at 165. 
 222. But see Kessler, supra note 6 (examining the law’s inability to recognize women’s 
caregiving). 
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2. Communitarian’s Response to the Rhetoric of Choice 
Communitarianism is a “set of ideas centered on issues of 
community, moral education and shared values.”223  It rests on the idea 
that we have a mutual responsibility to each other as citizens and that a 
stable political community depends on this shared responsibility.224  
Relatedly, the absence of Americans’ sense of obligation to one another 
has been criticized: “It is as if we roam at large in a land of strangers, 
where we presumptively have no obligation towards others except to 
avoid the active infliction of harm.”225  The contemporary communitarian 
movement began in 1990 when Amitai Etzioni and William Galston met 
with a group of ethicists, social philosophers, and social scientists to 
discuss the matters that “afflict our society,”226 including the troubling 
nature of Americans who are quick to demand rights but reluctant to 
accept responsibilities.227  The communitarian agenda asserts that it is 
dedicated to the betterment of our moral, social, and political 
environment.228  Communitarians believe that a community is a place 
where people really care about one another.229 
Communitarianism is thought to be opposed to liberalism, with the 
latter’s focus on autonomy and individual rights.230  Consider this 
description of the difference between liberalism and communitarianism: 
                                                     
 223. Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law Reform for African-
Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1994). 
 224. Id. 
 225. David Abraham, Are Rights the Right Thing? Individual Rights, Communitarian Purposes 
and America’s Problems, 25 CONN. L. REV. 947, 956 (1993) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, 
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)) (using the example of there 
being no duty under the law to rescue a stranger). 
 226. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE 
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 14–15 (1993). 
 227. Id. at 15. 
 228. Id. at 2. 
 229. Id. at 31. 
 230. Brown-Scott, supra note 223, at 1217 (referring to communitarianism as a “postmodern 
rejection of liberalism”); see also id. at 1216 (noting that legal and political theorists have critiqued 
liberalism which has resulted in gain to a small, all-white, all-male community).  But see Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a Communitarian 
Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 586 (1996) (arguing that 
communitarianism does not necessarily conflict with liberalism and that a communitarian 
perspective does not need to reject personal privacy and individual autonomy).  Perhaps somewhere 
in the middle, communitarianism has also been defined as a “sociological perspective focused on 
balancing personal autonomy and rights with the common good and shared interests.”  Nancy 
Kubasek & Melissa Hinds, The Communitarian Case Against Prosecutions for Prenatal Drug 
Abuse, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 2 (2000).  These authors believe that communitarianism is 
equally concerned with the collective benefit and personal autonomy—in that it values both 
individual rights and social responsibilities.  Id. at 12. 
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For the liberal, liberty and autonomy are the only means by which a 
person incurs an obligation.  By contrast, communitarianism maintains 
that one’s most important obligations derive from membership in a 
community, and cannot be explained by the autonomy model.231 
Perhaps most importantly for this Article’s purpose, communitarians 
believe that one of the most important communities to which we belong 
is our families.  Communitarians have very strong views about the 
importance and role of the family.232  They believe that we all learn 
moral values through the communities to which we belong.233  Humans 
depend on each other for the formation of their personalities;234 therefore, 
the “highest priority of social policy is to reach young children and 
provide them with new and better environments, new and better 
opportunities.”235  Etzioni states: “Families and communities are the 
ground-level generators and preservers of values and ethical systems.  
No society can remain vital or even survive without a reasonable base of 
shared values. . . . They are generated chiefly in the family . . . .”236 
Another scholar stated that democracy requires certain traits that are 
dependent on raising children well: “It demands citizens who can 
subordinate personal preferences to laws and to elected representatives, 
appreciate the values of freedom and democracy, recognize the 
legitimacy of the state, and, at least to some extent, rationally weigh 
options.  Adequate child rearing is central to the development of these 
characteristics.”237  The problem, according to some communitarians, is 
that there are not enough families teaching their children right from 
wrong.238 
                                                     
 231. Robert Justin Lipkin, Progressivism as Communitarian Democracy, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 
229, 240 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
 232. See, e.g., Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 445, 450 
(1987) (“charity begins at home”).  I believe it is possible to learn from these beliefs even without 
embracing all of them all of the time.  In other words, I follow the familiar mantra “take what is 
useful and throw out the rest.”  As I address the communitarian platform regarding families, I will 
also explain where I part company with some communitarian beliefs.  When I refer to the 
communitarian “platform” regarding families, I am referring primarily to the platform proposed by 
Etzioni.  The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, in ETZIONI, supra 
note 226, at 251–67.  I do not assert that all communitarians would agree with what I describe as the 
communitarian platform regarding families. 
 233. See Brown-Scott, supra note 223, at 1211 (stating that we have lost sight of the importance 
of civic duty and the role of the family, the school, the church, and the community in identifying 
shared moral values). 
 234. Selznick, supra note 232, at 447. 
 235. Id. at 457 (emphasis omitted). 
 236. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 31 (quoting JOHN GARDNER, BUILDING COMMUNITY 5 (1991)). 
 237. Eichner, supra note 208, at 173 (footnotes omitted). 
 238. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 29.  It is true that Etzioni defines family traditionally, i.e., 
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Etzioni states that parents have a moral responsibility to the 
community to invest themselves in the proper upbringing of their 
children.239  He believes that there is a parenting deficit in society today, 
which he blames on both parents working too much and spending too 
little time at home.240  He believes that children need attention and that 
both parents should be involved in their children’s lives.241  Although 
Etzioni recognizes exceptions for those who must work full-time for 
economic reasons, he generally believes that strangers should not be 
raising infants and toddlers,242 and that most daycares are understaffed 
and poor substitutes for parents.243 
Etzioni also criticizes parents for putting the pursuit of wealth ahead 
of raising children.244  While he recognizes that “women are obviously 
entitled to all the same rights men are, including the pursuit of greed,”245 
he states that “few people who advocated equal rights for women favored 
                                                                                                                       
husband, wife, and kids.  I do not believe that only traditional families can be successful.  But I do 
agree with communitarians that families of all kinds are not doing a very good job of teaching their 
children right from wrong.  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues that we can support non-traditional 
families while remaining true to a communitarian perspective.  See generally Woodhouse, supra 
note 230.  She states: 
We must clarify the link between responsibilities and rights without ostracizing 
households and kin groups that function as “kinships of responsibility” simply because 
they deviate from traditional nuclear family norms.  Rather than distrusting all 
nontraditional families as antifamily or narrowly individualistic, we need to judge them 
by what they do. 
Id. at 587. 
 239. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 54.  This is true even if people are caring for children that they 
did not necessarily choose to have.  See Selznick, supra note 232, at 451 (stating that “[p]arents are 
responsible for the children they have, not for those they might have liked to have or only for those 
they choose to have”). 
 240. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 55–56. 
 241. Id. at 56. 
 242. Id. at 60; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2006) (“[I]t is important for the development of 
children and the family unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early 
childrearing . . . .”). 
 243. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 58, 60. 
 244. Id. at 63.  He also criticizes parents for getting divorces, arguing that children are almost 
always better off with an intact family and that changes to the family through divorce are very 
disruptive to the children.  Id. at 60–61.  I do not disagree that divorce is a traumatic experience for 
all of the parties, but I would never assume to know what is best for individual couples and families.  
This is one of the areas where I disagree with Etzioni, but I do not believe that this disagreement 
means that we cannot benefit from other aspects of the communitarian platform.  For a contrary view 
on the definition of family, see Woodhouse, supra note 230, at 575 (discussing whether and how 
non-traditional families can claim legal authority and public support to carry out their caregiving 
functions).  Woodhouse argues that a household is a home “when its members are bound together by 
a powerful sense of specific obligation—legal, cultural, religious and/or moral.”  Id. at 576.  
Woodhouse does not believe that non-traditional families will destroy family values.  Id. at 579. 
 245. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 63.  But see Kessler, supra note 6, at 384 (noting that most 
women must work, including married women, whose income is necessary to provide for the family 
and help them avoid poverty upon divorce). 
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a society in which sexual equality would mean a society in which all 
adults would act like men, who in the past were relatively inattentive to 
children.”246  While many (including this author) would not agree that all 
or even most parents are neglecting their parenting duties, it is clear that 
the full-time, face-time norm of most workplaces makes it difficult for 
parents to attend properly to the upbringing of their children. 
Other scholars have also emphasized the “fundamental morality” of 
caregiving work and the “importance of such work to the sustenance of 
society.”247  Professor Kessler states that we need to continually focus on 
the morality of caregiving “because caregiving work is fundamental to 
the functioning of society, the continuation of the human race, and the 
living of a full life.”248  Another scholar stated that it is important to 
support parenting “because of the important role that fostering 
connections generally and parenting specifically should play in a healthy 
community.”249 
Understanding the importance of caregiving—not just for the parents 
who raise the children, but for the rest of society—helps us understand 
how the focus on the “choices” parents make is flawed.  As 
communitarian theory teaches us, parenting and other caregiving is not 
simply a choice—it is a responsibility, and caregivers fulfillment of that 
responsibility benefits everyone.  Recognizing this fact provides the 
response to both the apathy of employers and coworkers.  In response to 
the “why care” question—why care about the choices parents have 
made?—communitarian theory answers: because raising children well is 
not merely a choice, it is a responsibility. 
Similarly, a caregiver’s “choice” to tend to the care of an adult 
family member who is elderly, sick or disabled is also a responsibility.  
In many ways, one can view the decision to care for adult family 
members as even less of a “free choice” than the decision to have 
children.  We do not get to choose our parents, nor do we choose when 
parents, spouses or other family members become ill or otherwise need 
care.  The only “choice” that might be made in this regard is the choice 
regarding who in a family is going to care for the ill or disabled family 
member.  In many families, there is no choice.  One spouse must care for 
the other.  As families become smaller and more spread out 
geographically, there are fewer choices regarding who will care for an 
elderly parent.  Instead, in many cases, the only question is how the 
                                                     
 246. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 63. 
 247. Kessler, supra note 6, at 453. 
 248. Id. at 456–57. 
 249. Eichner, supra note 208, at 169. 
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caregiver will balance the caregiving role with her job.  Even if a 
caregiver has the financial resources available to have full-time in-home 
care or to place the relative in a nursing home, there will still be some 
caregiving responsibilities.  Moreover, many individuals do not have the 
option of having full-time care for a loved one.  They cannot afford such 
care.  Accordingly, caregiving for other adults can also be seen as a 
responsibility and not merely a choice. 
B. Special-Treatment Stigma 
The other criticism likely to be directed at efforts to remedy 
caregiver discrimination is that the reforms needed to remedy the 
caregiver conundrum for real workers might cause special-treatment 
stigma.  As mentioned above, this stigma manifests itself in two ways.  
First, if legal reform required employers to offer accommodations or 
other special treatment to caregiving employees,250 employers might be 
less likely to hire caregivers, and because most primary caregivers are 
women, employers might be less likely to hire women.251  The second 
manifestation of special-treatment stigma is in the form of resentment by 
other employees.252  These days, non-parents appear to be even more 
resentful of parents.253  If employers do allow parents to have flex-time, 
work reduced hours, or to avoid overtime—all measures that might be 
needed for real workers—the non-parent employees may resent the 
caregiving employees.  This conflict and resentment makes it difficult to 
justify reform efforts designed to remedy the caregiver conundrum.  
Adopting reform that would protect all caregivers and not just parents 
would be one small step in the right direction, particularly because any 
                                                     
 250. While it is not this Article’s goal to engage in a comprehensive discussion of reform, it 
seems obvious that at least some of the reform efforts would include forcing or encouraging 
employers to offer some benefits to caregivers, such as flexible schedules or reduced-hours.  Even if 
the employer offered similar benefits to non-caregiving employees, it would likely be the case that 
mostly caregivers would take advantage of such benefits, thereby contributing to the special-
treatment stigma. 
 251. BLAU & EHRENBERG, supra note 205, at 4 (arguing that mandated leave policies increase 
costs to employers, which may lead them to pay women less or to not hire as many women to avoid 
the leave costs altogether); Finley, supra note 123, at 1151; Grossman, supra note 125, at 47–49 
(discussing the concerns that the FMLA would hurt women because mandated leave would make 
employers less willing to hire women). 
 252. Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 392–93; Lester, supra note 20, at 43–44. 
 253. Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 374 (stating that today’s workplace creates an 
environment where the tensions between ideal workers and those with caregiving needs is 
exacerbated).  But see GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 46, at 33 (noting that only one percent of 
employers mention coworker resentment as an obstacle to providing family-friendly benefits despite 
the fact that the media mentions this resentment quite a bit). 
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employee could find herself in a caregiving role for a family member at 
any time and therefore should be supportive of such reform.254  However, 
this step is not enough.  While more and more adults will find themselves 
caring for elderly parents or other family members at some point in their 
lives, the overwhelming majority of caregivers for elders are still women 
and the number of parents greatly outnumbers those engaging in other 
caregiving responsibilities.255  Accordingly, many scholars have 
expressed concern over laws and policies that are seen as giving special 
treatment to women.256  Because, as discussed below, this concern has 
not been adequately addressed by either liberal theory or feminist legal 
theory, a turn to communitarian theory is warranted. 
1. The Equal-Treatment Versus Special-Treatment Debate 
In addition to liberal theory’s emphasis on autonomy and the choices 
parents make, the other problem with liberal theory is its focus on formal 
equality or the equal-treatment doctrine—the idea that likes should be 
treated alike.257  Of course, the problem with the doctrine is not the 
concept of equality itself—after all, who can quarrel with the idea that 
similarly situated people should be treated the same—rather, the problem 
is the failure to see differences where they exist and the tendency to treat 
all differences as inferior.258  The equality doctrine is unable to account 
for differences that are culturally based, which include most of women’s 
caregiving roles.259  Because men and women are not similarly situated 
with respect to caregiving roles, the formal equality principle of liberal 
theory allows the law, and employers, to treat caregivers differently.260  
                                                     
 254. See Lester, supra note 20, at 44 (noting that coworkers’ objection to providing benefits for 
caregiving—in this case, paid leave—has less merit when it comes to elder care because people do 
not choose their parents or plan on them getting sick). 
 255. Williams, supra note 2 (noting that one in four families care for elderly relatives but also 
that women are still overwhelmingly the primary caregivers); cf. GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 46, at 
23 (one study found that seventy-five percent of employers offer time off for employees to care for 
elders without jeopardizing their jobs). 
 256. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 19, at 576 (arguing that women should not necessarily be given 
many choices of work flexibility, to the extent those choices are not also given to men); Selmi & 
Cahn, supra note 25, at 23 (arguing that mandated additional paid leave could cause employers to 
not hire as many women if employers believed that mostly women would be taking the leave). 
 257. Littleton, supra note 26, at 1294 (quoting Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1949)) (the hornbook definition of equal 
protection, which she calls symmetry, is “that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated”). 
 258. Kessler, supra note 6, at 432, 438. 
 259. Id. at 434–35. 
 260. See Finley, supra note 123, at 1153–54 (noting that “our tradition with equality has too 
often meant prejudice toward those whom the dominant group has labeled as different”). 
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Because workplace norms have been set by men considering only their 
lives and bodies, women’s lives and bodies—both the biological fact that 
they get pregnant and the cultural fact that they do the majority of 
housework and childcare—will always be seen as different and this 
difference is then used against them.261  Thus, liberal theory’s insistence 
on formal equality means that women’s caregiving roles will always be 
seen as different and therefore justify different treatment.  Liberal theory 
is helpful for remedying discrimination against ideal worker caregivers—
they are similarly situated to their non-caregiver counterparts and yet are 
treated differently—but it cannot be used to remedy discriminatory 
treatment against real workers because they are not similarly situated to 
their non-caregiver coworkers. 
The equal-treatment doctrine was the main impetus behind the early 
stages of feminist legal theory.262  Beginning in the 1980s, however, 
“special-treatment” feminists began to recognize the problem with 
formal equality.  Special-treatment feminists generally believe that 
women need to be given accommodations or preferential treatment in the 
workplace and elsewhere to make up for the disadvantages suffered 
because of pregnancy, childbirth, and caregiving responsibilities.263  
Special treatment has also been called substantive equality, as opposed to 
formal equality.264  Substantive equality advocates note that even if we 
treat people alike and “[parcel] out goods such as workplace benefits 
according to egalitarian distributive principles,” this might not provide 
equal results on the other end.265  To make people equal, we often need to 
give out varying amounts of substantive entitlements.  However, as noted 
above, this special treatment may create resentment among fellow  
 
                                                     
 261. Id. at 1154–56. 
 262. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, 23–25 (1999).  
Feminist Legal Theory is thought to have proceeded through stages—Professor Chamallas describes 
them as the Equality Stage of the 1970s, the Difference Stage of the 1980s, and the Diversity Stage 
of the 1990s and beyond.  Id. at 23–30.  According to most courts we are still in the Equality Stage.  
Id. at 23. 
 263. Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 350 (“Although there is no consensus on the precise 
remedial efforts needed to address women’s disadvantage, a consistent feature of the discussion is 
the recognition by most participants that some form of workplace accommodation beyond 
compliance with basic gender discrimination principles is needed to effectuate equal opportunity for 
caregivers.”); Finley, supra note 123, at 1146–47 (summarizing this view); Kessler, supra note 6, at 
439 (noting that some feminists argue for accommodation for biologically-based differences); 
Littleton, supra note 26, at 1295–96 (discussing the varying “asymmetrical” models of sexual 
equality). 
 264. See, e.g., Finley, supra note 123, at 1144. 
 265. Id. 
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employees and may cause employers to hire fewer women because of the 
real or perceived higher costs of providing these entitlements.266 
Furthermore, special treatment suffers from one of the same flaws as 
equal treatment: it uses the male norm as a point of comparison.267  
Because women are different from men with respect to caregiving 
responsibilities, the equal-treatment doctrine allows them to be treated 
differently, yet even the special-treatment approach only sees women as 
different because it compares them to men.268  Some scholars have 
questioned whether the male norm—as an ideal worker relatively 
disconnected with family life—is normatively right or merely the norm 
only because those who have had the power to define the norms have 
always been men.269  As stated by one scholar: “[o]ne wonders why those 
who appreciate the inadequacy of the male norm for accommodating and 
measuring women adhere to a doctrinal framework that is designed only 
to compare against the norm, and not to question it.”270  Regardless of 
whether women are the same as men or different from men, the problem 
with both equal treatment and special treatment is that men are the 
standard, and the standard itself is never questioned. 
Moreover, most Americans do not question why difference matters 
at all.  Professor Christine Littleton proposes a model of “equality as 
acceptance.”271  She argues that the “difference between human beings, 
whether perceived or real, and whether biologically or socially based, 
should not be permitted to make a difference in the lived-out equality of 
those persons.”272  In other words, male and female differences should be 
“costless relative to each other.”273  Her approach is very appealing, but 
the reality is that some differences between sexes are not, in fact, 
costless.  We may theorize that they should be costless all we want, but 
at the end of the day, leaves of absence and accommodations for 
caregiving have costs,274 so we need another theory to support our 
willingness to impose these costs. 
                                                     
 266. Id. at 1151. 
 267. See id. at 1154–56 (discussing the problem with using the male norm when it comes to 
women’s caregiving responsibilities). 
 268. See id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 1156. 
 271. Littleton, supra note 26, at 1285. 
 272. Id. at 1284–85. 
 273. Id. at 1285. 
 274. Some would argue that even though accommodating caregiving has costs, these costs are 
outweighed by the benefit of employee morale and less attrition.  See sources cited supra note 194. 
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Moreover, the equal-treatment versus special-treatment debate 
ignores the other interests at stake.  Feminist legal theory generally does 
not pay any more attention to the value of children and raising them well 
than liberal theory does.275  Some feminists care about children quite a 
bit,276 but most feminists are primarily concerned with women’s equality 
and secondarily with the importance of children and family.277  Some 
feminists believed that cultural feminism was the answer to the equal-
treatment versus special-treatment debate.278  Cultural feminism 
acknowledged and emphasized the relationship of women to their 
children279—an emphasis which some believe is necessary to have 
caregiving properly valued in our society and workplaces.  The problem 
with cultural feminism, however, is that it “risks reaffirming the 
dichotomies of liberal discourse rather than overthrowing them to move 
toward a world in which interconnection is the norm for both men and 
women.”280  Put another way, cultural feminism perpetuates the 
stereotypical role of mother as primary caregiver, rather than recognizing 
that both sexes can and should nurture children.281  Because liberal 
theory and feminist legal theory have not led to a solution to special-
treatment stigma, a turn to communitarian theory is in order. 
2. Communitarian Theory’s Response to Special-Treatment Stigma 
This Article theorizes that the communitarian theory has two 
responses to special-treatment stigma.282  First, as a general matter, 
communitarians emphasize a departure from a preoccupation with rights 
in favor of an emphasis on responsibility toward others.  
Communitarians believe we have a responsibility to everyone in our 
community.  Second, and more specifically, the emphasis on the societal  
 
                                                     
 275. Eichner, supra note 208, at 165. 
 276. See Kessler, supra note 6, at 379–81 (analyzing various feminist projects that focus on 
children and caregiving). 
 277. See, e.g., Eichner, supra note 208, at 166 (providing a leading feminist’s argument that 
focuses on how women are economically disadvantaged by the poor accommodations of employers, 
rather than focusing on the impact on children and family). 
 278. See id. at 167. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. See Littleton, supra note 26, at 1331 (discussing the problems with stereotypes over cultural 
differences between the sexes). 
 282. This is my interpretation of how I think communitarian theorists would respond to this 
specific issue.  I have not seen this issue addressed directly by those who claim to be 
communitarians. 
0.6.0_PORTER FINAL 1/4/2010  10:33:16 AM 
2010] WHY CARE ABOUT CAREGIVERS? 395 
value of parents raising their children well can help eliminate special-
treatment stigma. 
One central tenet of communitarianism is that our over-emphasis on 
individual rights has hurt our communities and our society.283  
Communitarians argue that rights come with responsibilities.284  
Furthermore, not all responsibilities will lead to immediate benefits.285  
Other scholars have also emphasized the priority of duty over wants, 
including claims of right.286  Although rights are important, 
communitarians are not rights-centered.  Rights are secondary to duty 
and responsibility.287  Communitarians believe that rights alone do not 
make a good society.288  Instead, they believe our preoccupation with 
rights has gone too far and that a return to politics and community can 
help to overcome the problems in America.289 
Instead of an emphasis on rights, the central value of 
communitarianism is belonging.290  As one scholar stated: 
“[communitarianism’s] central doctrinal feature locates the essence of 
the human being in her relationship to others and to her community.”291  
Communitarians’ core values entail concern for others and the 
“commons we share.”292  This does not mean that the self is no longer 
important: 
                                                     
 283. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 4–14. 
 284. Id. at 1.  For instance, according to communitarians, it is wrong to refuse or avoid jury 
service while simultaneously demanding the right to be tried by a jury of one’s peers.  Id. at 10. 
 285. For instance, we have a responsibility to take care of the environment, but the benefits we 
gain from that will not be felt immediately.  Id. at 10–11; see also Selznick, supra note 232, at 451–
52 (stating that some obligations are not reciprocal). 
 286. See, e.g., Selznick, supra note 232, at 454; see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS 
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 77 (1991) (stating that “[b]uried deep in our 
rights dialect is an unexpressed premise that . . . we presumptively have no obligations toward others 
except to avoid the active infliction of harm”). 
 287. Selznick, supra note 232, at 454. 
 288. See Abraham, supra note 225, at 950–51, 956 (pointing out that America’s emphasis on 
individual rights has led to an inequality of wealth, an increase in children living in poverty, an 
environment where sociopaths outnumber strollers on many streets, and infant and black male 
mortality rates that compare unfavorably with third world countries and noting that those in 
situations of dependency—mothers, children, the sick, the old, and the poor—are worse off in the 
United States than in any comparable country). 
 289. See id. 953 (discussing how the focus on rights produces negative synergy, as every claim 
for rights produces a counter-claim for rights, resulting in “individual absolutism, group egotism, 
and the disappearance of social obligation”). 
 290. Selznick, supra note 232, at 454. 
 291. Brown-Scott, supra note 223, at 1217. 
 292. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 10; see also Woodhouse, supra note 230, at 573 (criticizing 
laws and policies that put individual freedoms over equally important values that bind individuals 
together, such as commitment and responsibility). 
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The communitarian ethic recognizes [the] need [for protection of the 
self], for communities could not exist without individuals—with a 
sense of self—to animate them.  However, one’s identity, one’s sense 
of self is shaped by others in the community.  Thus, to claim a 
protective ownership of our individual identities is to claim ownership 
of the communities that constitute each of us.293 
Communitarians believe that the community bears the responsibility of 
each individual member of the community.294  As stated in Etzioni’s 
book: “We adopted the name Communitarian to emphasize that the time 
has come to attend to our responsibilities to the conditions and elements 
we all share, to the community.”295 
One of the problems with special-treatment stigma is that it pits one 
group against another, in this case, caregivers against non-caregivers—
and usually, women against men.  Communitarian theory teaches that 
there are other interests at stake—children, adult loved ones who need 
some care, and the communities to which they belong.  Families need 
more than a marriage license to raise their families—they need an 
infrastructure of jobs, housing, public health, schools, and community 
services to raise healthy children.296  Similarly, it has been said that 
“strong, healthy, and vigorous individuals can develop only within the 
context of strong, healthy, and vigorous communities.”297  Instead of 
viewing accommodations for parenting as only benefitting the parents, 
communitarian theory helps us to understand that we all benefit from 
parents’ choice to procreate; after all, society needs procreation to 
continue and employers need procreation to continue to have employees 
in the future.298  As Professor Fineman states: “caretaking work supplies 
an important and essential public good.  Every society and every 
institution in society is dependent upon caretaking labor in order to 
perpetuate and reproduce itself.”299  Accordingly, caretaking labor  
 
                                                     
 293. Enrique R. Carrasco, Collective Recognition as a Communitarian Device: Or, Of Course 
We Want to Be Role Models!, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 81, 101 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
 294. Kubasek & Hinds, supra note 230, at 12. 
 295. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 15; see also Abraham, supra note 225, at 956 (claiming that our 
emphasis on individual autonomy makes collective action—whether as a family, a neighborhood, or 
a trade union—much more difficult than in Europe); Woodhouse, supra note 230, at 585 (discussing 
the “soft” communitarian perspective that stresses the need to foster communities of mutual 
responsibility and support). 
 296. Woodhouse, supra note 230, at 580. 
 297. Kubasek & Hinds, supra note 230, at 12. 
 298. Finley, supra note 123, at 1137–38. 
 299. Fineman, supra note 202, at 1406. 
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creates a societal debt, which binds each and every member of society, 
not only individual family members.300 
Furthermore, one of the most important lessons learned from 
communitarianism is that everyone lives with the consequences of 
children who are not brought up well and who then terrorize 
communities through misconduct and crime.301  Studies indicate that 
those children who spent too much time taking care of themselves were 
more likely to engage in risky behavior, such as abusing controlled 
substances, and more likely to have anger management problems.302  
Etzioni believes that many of today’s problems are attributable to lack of 
parenting.  He states: “Gang warfare in the streets, massive drug abuse, a 
poorly committed work force, and a strong sense of entitlement and weak 
sense of responsibility are, to a large extent, the product of poor 
parenting.”303  Communitarian Mary Ann Glendon agrees.  She argues 
that current patterns of family behavior are not optimal for children.304  
She also notes the mounting evidence of the relationship “between child-
raising conditions and crime rates, national competitiveness, and the 
future of the social security system.”305 
Professor Fineman believes that workplaces need to be restructured 
so that the “burdens for dependency” can be redistributed more equitably 
between family and market.306  In Fineman’s analysis, this is not “special 
treatment” but instead is part of the “basic right of accommodation due to 
all members of society as they engage in society-enhancing or -
preserving tasks.”307  She recognizes that there is the possibility for those 
who do not have caregiving responsibilities to fear that they will be 
exploited.308  Her response is to point out that exploitation of caregivers 
has been the norm—that the labor of caregivers has always been 
“appropriated for the good of the larger society without compensation or 
                                                     
 300. Id. at 1410–11. 
 301. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 54, 69 (“The community—that is, all of us—suffers the ill 
effects of absentee parenting.”). 
 302. Id. at 69; see also Dowd, supra note 18, at 449–54 (discussing the negative effects of 
teenagers being left alone without parental involvement); Kaminer, supra note 9, at 317 (noting that 
the American work system undermines the needs of children). 
 303. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 69. 
 304. GLENDON, supra note 225, at 127 (pointing to a study which indicated that “a whole 
generation of American teenagers was ‘less healthy, less cared for and less prepared for life than 
their parents were at the same age’”). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Fineman, supra note 202, at 1437. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 1438. 
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accommodation.”309  Similarly, Etzioni states: “the time has come for 
both parents to revalue children and for the community to support and 
recognize their efforts.”310 
Accordingly, the communitarian theory supports the effort here to 
define the caregiver conundrum broadly to include real workers.  If we 
recognize that raising children well takes more commitment from parents 
than an ideal-worker schedule will allow,311 and that raising children well 
benefits society, we should be willing to help caregivers balance work 
and family.312  Put another way, we should respect and protect real 
workers and not just ideal workers.  Generally, it is real workers who 
attempt to spend sufficient time with their children to raise them well,313 
“provid[ing] not only material necessities, but also moral education and 
character formation.”314  Etzioni believes that “[r]eevaluating the value of 
children will help bring about the needed change of heart” to support 
efforts to help parents successfully raise their children.315  He states: 
“Above all, what we need is a change in orientation by both parents and 
workplaces.  Child rearing is important, valuable work, work that must 
be honored rather than denigrated by both parents and the 
community.”316  Because parents need workplace flexibility, employers 
and—to a lesser extent—coworkers should be willing to provide this 
support so that parents are able to take on the important responsibilities 
of raising their children and attending to their other caregiving roles.317 
                                                     
 309. Id. 
 310. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 63; see also Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 25 (discussing the 
public’s responsibility toward raising future generations). 
 311. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 53. 
 312. See Dixon, supra note 13, at 648 (stating that society as a whole benefits when children are 
better prepared to contribute as productive members of society). 
 313. I do not mean to suggest that employees performing as ideal workers cannot be good and 
influential parents.  Many manage to be both ideal workers and great parents, either because they 
work different shifts, leaving one parent home with the children as much as possible, or because 
their jobs are not that demanding, making it possible to perform as ideal workers and ideal parents.  
Sometimes the parents have enough high quality caregiving and household help that they can devote 
all of their time at home to their children, rather than dividing the time off work between caregiving 
and other household responsibilities.  Having said this, I believe it is easier to be a better parent the 
more time you have to spend with your children.  If I did not have a job that allowed me to do a 
substantial portion of my work at home, after the kids are in bed, I do not feel that I could be the type 
of parent I want to be, or that I believe my kids need.  Many “ideal workers” are expected to work 
overtime, and if they have a commute, they often get to see their younger children for only an hour 
or less each day.  I believe that it is difficult to be a good parent—especially to young children—
when you only have one hour with your kids each day. 
 314. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 256. 
 315. Id. at 72. 
 316. Id. at 257. 
 317. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
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Obviously, coworkers cannot directly provide support to caregivers, 
but they can avoid sabotaging the efforts made by employers to 
accommodate working caregivers.318  In addition to the most compelling 
reason for coworkers to support caregivers’ efforts—that is, the benefit 
to society when parents are given the tools to successfully raise their 
children—there are two other reasons why non-caregiving coworkers 
should care about the caregiver conundrum.  First, flexibility and benefits 
given to caregivers often have positive spillover effects for non-
caregivers.319  As I have argued elsewhere, employees should be willing 
to support each other because the “loyalty given to that community [the 
workplace] also benefits them.”320  Second, non-parents could find 
themselves engaging in caregiving at any point.  Even if they do not 
“choose” to have children, they do not get to choose their parents, and 
many of these parents could become dependent as they age, forcing their 
children into caregiving roles.321  Not only could many workers find 
themselves engaging in caregiving without affirmatively making the 
choice to do so,322 but fulfilling this role does benefit society.  Perhaps 
the benefit to society of caring for adults is not quite as compelling as the 
benefits of caring for children.  Nevertheless, there are benefits to society 
when disabled or elderly adults are being cared for by loved ones.  Most 
would agree, and studies show, that people have better health and 
increased happiness when cared for by loved ones.323  Furthermore, 
society needs the thirty-three million unpaid family caregivers to 
continue giving that care.324  The long-term care system would collapse 
without the work of unpaid family caregivers, causing nursing homes to 
                                                     
 318. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
 319. See Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential, supra note 11, at 88 (suggesting that 
successful disparate impact discrimination cases can have spillover benefits to other employees); see 
also Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities 
Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 349–56 (2009) (explaining how 
benefits given to disabled employees have positive spillover effects for individuals without 
disabilities). 
 320. Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled Employees 
and Their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 361 (2007). 
 321. Fineman, supra note 202, at 1439.  I have made a similar argument with respect to 
disabilities.  See id. at 361–62 (discussing the communitarian theory as a justification for some of the 
burdens reasonable accommodations provided to disabled employees have on non-disabled 
coworkers). 
 322. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 323. K. Nicole Harms, Note, Caring for Mom & Dad: The Importance of Family-Provided 
Eldercare and the Positive Implications of California’s Paid Family Leave Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 69, 83–85 (2003) (discussing the benefit of having elders cared for by family 
members). 
 324. Jane Gross, Blog, Who Cares for the Caregivers?, N.Y. TIMES, http://newoldage.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2008/10/14/who-cares-for-the-caregivers/ (Oct. 14, 2008, 9:30 EST). 
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“burst at the seams.”325  Finally, we all benefit from allowing caregivers 
to balance work and family because this means that as we age or become 
disabled and need care, we will reap the benefits of having institutional 
structures in place that will allow our loved ones to care for us without 
sacrificing their jobs. 
Etzioni also points out how the benefit of raising children well can 
impute to employers, who should in turn help caregivers balance work 
and family.326  He explains that what corporations complain about with 
regard to their employees “is a deficiency of character and an inability to 
control impulses, defer gratification, and commit to the task at hand.”327  
If parents are with their children more to teach them the values to 
overcome these deficiencies in character, these children will become 
more productive adult employees.  This, in turn, benefits employers, so 
employers should be willing to invest in their own future by investing in 
the parents who raise the children of the future.328  Etzioni states: 
[W]orkplaces should provide maximum flexible opportunities to 
parents to preserve an important part of their time and energy, of their 
life, to attend to their educational-moral duties, for the sake of the next 
generation, its civic and moral character, and its capacity to contribute 
economically and socially to the commonweal.329 
I recognize that getting employers and employees to recognize these 
benefits will require a significant change in attitude.  As Fineman noted, 
most employers “do not consider themselves appropriately held 
responsible for meeting workers’ needs or desires.”330  I also am not 
naïve enough to believe that this change in heart will happen 
                                                     
 325. Id. 
 326. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 67–68; see also Eichner, supra note 208, at 168 (stating that we 
need to look at all of the interests at stake in the conflict between work and parenting, including the 
social value of parenting and the necessity of parenting for any community to sustain itself). 
 327. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 67. 
 328. See Finley, supra note 123, at 1175 (stating that “employers should bear [some of the costs 
of accommodating caregiving] because childbearing and rearing are crucially important social 
functions that are connected to and have major impacts on the work world”).  It would seem that not 
many employers subscribe to the view that they can benefit from investing in the workforce of the 
future by investing in the parents who are raising those future workers.  One study of employers 
revealed that only one percent of employers implement work versus life balance initiatives to ensure 
the workforce of tomorrow is of high quality.  GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 46, at 32.  Note, 
however, that this study also indicated that employers do have some benevolent motives for 
initiating family friendly policies.  Id. (noting that 7% of employers studied implement these policies 
because “it’s the right thing to do,” 6% do so because the company considers itself a caring 
organization, and 4% do so because the company considers itself a family organization). 
 329. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 257 (emphasis omitted). 
 330. Fineman, supra note 202, at 1434. 
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immediately or easily.  In this sense, I am only beginning a discussion 
that must continue for some time before we can expect to see any real 
change.  Ultimately, any legal reform in this area should be accompanied 
by a very good public relations campaign to convince individuals (both 
employees and employers) why it is to their benefit to support the efforts 
of caregivers trying to successfully balance work and family 
responsibilities.331 
In sum, one does not have to believe in the entire communitarian 
platform to recognize that the theory provides valuable insight into how 
we as a society should support caregivers’ efforts to balance work and 
family.  If we want the children of today to be successful, productive, 
law-abiding citizens in the future, we must invest in the upbringing of 
those children.  Similarly, we must recognize the benefits of caring for 
other adult family members.  We all can and should contribute to the 
solution by defining the caregiver conundrum broadly to include the 
protection of real workers, not just ideal workers, and we should embrace 
efforts to remedy discrimination for all caregivers.332  Etzioni stated it 
best: 
Having a child is not merely a personal, private matter.  It is an act that 
has significant consequences for the community.  Hence those who 
bring children in the world have a social obligation to attend to their 
moral education. . . .  The community should enable parents to do 
this—by encouraging paid leave, flextime, and other such measures—
and express its support for such an ordering of priorities.  This is not an 
indirect way of suggesting that mothers should stay home; both parents 
share the responsibility to attend to their children.  The community 
should not stigmatize but appreciate those who do.333 
One final caveat: While I believe there is a good deal of merit to the 
communitarian’s emphasis on the importance of raising children well, we 
should not try to define the substantive contours of what it means to be a 
                                                     
 331. In some ways, this issue resembles issues concerning our environment.  For a long time, the 
reaction to environmental advocacy was one of apathy.  People could not seem to make changes 
when there was no immediate benefit.  Furthermore, there seemed to be a sense that one person’s or 
even one family’s actions could not make a big difference.  Recently, however, the public seems to 
have come together—to some extent—to support environmental efforts.  Society now seems willing 
to make changes even when they will not be the beneficiary of those changes.  There is a recognition 
that the changes are necessary to make the world a better place for future generations.  Similarly, 
helping parents raise their children well will make the world a better place in the future.  We simply 
need to convince employers and employees that supporting parents now is important for our future. 
 332. See Kaminer, supra note 9, at 322–23.  While the communitarian emphasis is on the 
importance of raising children well, there is also societal benefit to other caregivers providing care to 
adult loved ones. 
 333. ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 88. 
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good parent.  We can adopt legal reforms that support parenting without 
mandating what parents should do.334  This point might be controversial.  
There are some who may argue that if we embrace the communitarian 
theory and its emphasis on raising children well and we ask employers, 
coworkers, and society to support measures aimed at helping caregivers 
balance work and family, then society should have some say on what 
parents should be doing to raise their children well.  This is a valid 
concern, but we do not need to mandate a certain level and quality of 
parenting to address it.  First of all, the purpose of helping caregivers 
balance work and family is to increase the range of choices working 
caregivers have, not to decrease those options.  Even if options were 
available that allowed working parents to work fewer hours, not all 
caregivers would choose to take advantage of such measures and we 
should not force them to do so.  Studies vary on how much time spent 
parenting is optimal and many couples who work demanding careers 
have family members or responsible, loving, nannies caring for their 
children.  Even though there are some who would disagree with a 
couple’s decision to have both spouses meeting the ideal-worker norm, 
as long as these parents are providing for the care of their children, it is 
not our place to dictate how these parents choose to balance work and 
family.335 
But with that said, if caregivers do choose to take advantage of some 
accommodations or benefits offered to them, it is a valid argument that 
these caregivers should actually use these benefits to engage in 
caregiving tasks.  This is not mandating how caregivers parent; it is 
simply ensuring that they are not abusing benefits given to them.  This 
issue arises under the FMLA and the law has had no trouble dealing with 
this kind of abuse.  Just as an employer can fire an employee who takes 
an FMLA leave of absence because of a serious health condition but is 
then spotted out on the golf course, an employer should be able to 
discipline or terminate an employee who uses an employer’s provided 
leave of absence or reduced-hour schedule for working a second job or 
                                                     
 334. See Eichner, supra note 208, at 176 (noting that parents should be able to parent as they see 
fit and recognizing that what it means to be a good parent varies enormously within and between 
cultures and over time). 
 335. It is also important to remember that families come in all shapes and sizes, and a 
grandparent, aunt, or loving nanny can fulfill many parenting obligations.  For a view on an 
alternative definition of family, see Woodhouse, supra note 230, at 575–76.  Woodhouse argues that 
a household is a home “when its members are bound together by a powerful sense of specific 
obligation—legal, cultural, religious and/or moral.”  Id. at 576.  Woodhouse does not believe that 
non-traditional families will destroy family values.  Id. at 579. 
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pursuing a hobby.336  In sum, while we should not mandate the exact 
contours of how a caregiver chooses to parent—meaning we should let 
ideal workers continue to be ideal workers—we can control for and 
handle the abuse that might occur under any law reform mandates that 
require an employer to provide flexibility to its caregiving employees. 
3. Ending the “Maternal Wall”337 
While this Article is devoted to all caregivers, both men and women, 
and both parents and other caregivers, the fact is that the difficulties of 
the caregiver conundrum flow mostly to women with children.338  It is 
this Article’s primary argument that we should define the caregiver 
conundrum broadly to include real workers because of the importance to 
society of raising children.  But I also am motivated by the desire to 
eliminate the rampant disadvantages that flow to women because of the 
caregiver conundrum.  The costs of discrimination against caregivers is 
high: “The economic and social subordination of women that flows from 
the history of workplace incompatibility with their childbearing role has 
contributed to the economically and psychologically damaging 
phenomenon known as the feminization of poverty.”339  We are beyond 
the time when modern employers can operate without women,340 yet 
many of the traditional workplace norms operate to push women out.341  
It is not enough that we have laws that account for biological differences 
between the sexes; we also must consider social differences between the 
sexes.342  In reality, women still perform the majority of childcare and 
housework tasks.343  Laws and employer policies that harm caregivers 
                                                     
 336. An employer can certainly choose to offer reduced hours and flexible schedules for other 
reasons besides caregiving responsibilities and some argue that they should.  WILLIAMS, UNENDING 
GENDER, supra note 4, at 85–88.  However, if they only offer such benefits for caregiving and the 
employee is not using it for caregiving, then the employer should be able to discipline the employee. 
 337. Id. at 69–70. 
 338. See generally id. (arguing that market and family organization are the cause of caregiver 
issues, especially with regard to women with children); Kessler, supra note 6 (showing a lack of 
legal protection for women caregivers with children). 
 339. Finley, supra note 123, at 1176.  Discrimination against caregivers also harms children, 
increasing their poverty and leading to increased child abuse.  Gershuny, supra note 52, at 213–14. 
 340. Dixon, supra note 13, at 649 (“It is by now clear that the American economy will probably 
never again function without the work of women.”); Kaminer, supra note 9, at 323 (explaining that 
working parents are valuable employees). 
 341. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 85 (questioning whether the 
conflicting social norms of the ideal worker and of parental care can be reconciled). 
 342. See Williams & Segal, supra note 19, at 80 (arguing that workplaces should not be 
designed around a man’s body and a man’s traditional immunity from caregiving). 
 343. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 1, 50 (“[I]n one-half to one-third of 
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levy a disproportionate harm on women.  In other words, remedying the 
caregiver conundrum for all workers will assure both workplace equality 
for women and the well-being of future generations.344 
In response to some critics who, echoing the resentment of 
coworkers, wonder why parenthood and caregiving deserves special 
treatment, it is important to remember that there are many other social 
programs and policies that force employers to spend money in a way that 
benefits some, but not all, employees.345  Examples include 
unemployment, workers’ compensation, and perhaps the best example, 
military leave.346  Military leave provides an apt analogy because, 
although some women need it, it mostly applies to men, and the law 
requires employers to reinstate employees who have been on military 
leave for up to five years.347  Those in the military are provided this 
“special treatment” because they are engaging in what many believe is 
socially desirable behavior.348  So are caregivers.  The fact that most 
caregivers are women, and that our current system operates to 
discriminate against them, is simply another reason for protecting 
caregivers.  However, the primary reason for protecting caregivers is, 
and should be, that they are engaging in socially desirable behavior—
raising the next generation of citizens and taking good care of their loved 
ones. 
V. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE 
If communitarian theory provides the justification for protecting real 
workers, the question remains: how do we best go about fashioning 
reform in this area?  It is not the goal of this Article to engage in a 
comprehensive discussion of all of the reforms needed and how they 
should be implemented.  That is a discussion left for the next Article. 
Instead, this part will give an overview of what might be required to 
remedy the caregiver conundrum.  This part will first give a general 
overview of the types of reforms that have been suggested, many of 
                                                                                                                       
families, mothers are at home.”). 
 344. See Lester, supra note 20, at 18 (arguing that paid family leave matters not only for gender 
equality, but also because it can improve child and elder welfare). 
 345. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 379 (comparing caregiving benefits as a logical 
outgrowth of other types of benefit packages). 
 346. Finley, supra note 123, at 1175–76. 
 347. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 
4312(a) (2006); see also id. at 1176 (“[D]efending the country in military service . . . is a task 
performed almost exclusively by men.”). 
 348. See Finley, supra note 123, at 1175–76. 
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which will be necessary to remedy the caregiver conundrum.  This part 
will then use the example of one specific reform, and discuss how the 
communitarian theoretical framework would justify it.  Finally, this part 
will respond to two anticipated criticisms of this Article’s proposal. 
A. A Laundry List of Reforms 
This Article has focused on the theoretical justification for broad 
reform, whereas the eventual goal of the reform piece will be to 
ameliorate the disadvantages faced by all caregivers.349  Reform must 
consider not just highly compensated professional women, but also 
lower-income laborers;350 not just full-time employees, but also part-time 
employees; not just women who want to work fewer hours, but also 
women who financially need to work full-time and overtime; not just 
pregnant women, but women after their babies are born and before they 
leave for college; not just ideal workers, but real workers.  
Comprehensive reform would also mean protecting caregiving 
employees regardless of the choices they make in balancing work and 
family.351  In other words, whether a caregiving employee needs more 
time,352 or needs more financial support in the form of subsidized 
daycare or paid time off, reform should be aimed at helping all 
caregivers successfully balance family and work. 
The list of possible reforms is almost endless: amend Title VII to add 
“parental or family status” to the list of protected categories;353 amend 
the FMLA or enact a new statute to cover more routine childcare needs, 
such as doctor’s appointments, visits with teachers, and minor 
illnesses;354 reduce the workweek;355 amend the FMLA to cover more 
                                                     
 349. See Dowd, supra note 18, at 434 (arguing that all classes and races need to be included in 
the discussion of work versus family policy). 
 350. Recently, several scholars have emphasized the need for reform to include low-income 
workers.  See generally id.; O’Leary, supra note 52; Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 8. 
 351. But see Selmi, supra note 19, at 576 (arguing that the work versus family “debate has 
stalemated because of a desire to support all choices for women”).  I both agree and disagree with 
Selmi’s position.  I agree that caregivers should not be able to work wherever and whenever they 
choose without financial penalty.  But I disagree with Selmi’s position that workplace equality for 
women—which he believes requires women to work more—is more important than workplace 
flexibility, which allows women and men caregivers to be better parents. 
 352. See supra Part II.A. 
 353. But see generally Smith, supra note 26 (exploring but ultimately rejecting this as a viable 
solution). 
 354. See id. at 618; Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 399; Kessler, supra note 6, at 462–63.  
During his campaign, President Obama promised to expand the FMLA to include absences for 
“elder care needs,” as well as up to twenty-four hours of leave each year to participate in children’s 
academic activities at school.  See BarackObama.com, Strengthening Families and Communities, 
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employees by decreasing or eliminating the one year or 1,250 hours of 
work requirement or decreasing the number of employees required to 
trigger coverage, or both;356 amend the FMLA, the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, or enact a new statute to provide for paid leave 
rather than only unpaid leave;357 provide subsidized daycare or begin the 
public school system at a younger age, or both;358 require or incentivize 
employers to provide family-friendly workplace policies, such as 
reduced hours, flexible hours, work from home arrangements, or job-
sharing;359 enact statutes designed to protect part-time employees;360 
enact process laws, which require employers to engage in an interactive 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/family/index_campaign.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). 
 355. Barbara R. Bergmann, Work-Family Policies and Equality Between Women and Men, in 
GENDER & FAMILY, supra note 205, at 278; Kessler, supra note 6, at 461. 
 356. For a discussion of the eligibility requirements see supra Part III.C.  See also O’Leary, 
supra note 52, at 59–60.  President Obama also plans to expand the FMLA to cover businesses with 
twenty-five or more employees, rather than the current requirement of fifty.  BarackObama.com, 
supra note 354. 
 357. See Lester, supra note 20; O’Leary, supra note 52, at 60; Michael Selmi, Family Leave and 
the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 770–72 (2000).  Etzioni suggests that we should have 
at least six months of paid leave for new parents and another eighteen months of unpaid leave so that 
parents can be home for the first two years of the child’s life.  ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 71.  
Almost all European countries provide for significantly more paid leave than we do.  See Finley, 
supra note 123, at 1173 (discussing the European countries which almost all provide significantly 
more leave for childbirth and parenting).  Some scholars argue that we should specifically 
incentivize men to take paternity leave to eliminate the gender imbalance in the workplace caused by 
the reality that women take far more leave than men.  See, e.g., Ayanna, supra note 183, at 296–97. 
 358. See generally Dixon, supra note 13.  Some also suggest that the school day and year should 
be lengthened to assist lower-income workers with burdens of after-school care.  Barbara R. 
Bergmann, Work-Family Policies and Equality Between Women and Men, in GENDER & FAMILY, 
supra note 205, at 278; H. Elizabeth Peters, The Role of Child Care & Parental Leave Policies in 
Supporting Family & Work Activities, in GENDER & FAMILY, supra note 205, at 280–83; Kessler, 
supra note 6, at 461; Selmi & Cahn, supra note 25, at 9. 
 359. Some have argued that there should be an accommodation model similar to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act or religious discrimination to protect caregivers need for different schedules in 
the workplace.  See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 615 (2004); Kaminer, supra note 9; Kessler, supra note 6, at 461; 
Smith, supra note 41.  Other scholars suggest that we need to convince employers to provide these 
policies voluntarily based on the ample literature regarding the long-term financial benefits of doing 
so.  See, e.g., WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 86–88; Rachel Arnow-Richman, 
Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal 
Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 25–28 (2007).  Finally, some scholars 
suggest that we provide tax incentives to those employers who are willing to become a more family-
friendly workplace.  See, e.g., ETZIONI, supra note 226, at 70–72.  President Obama also favors 
trying to expand flexible work arrangements.  His plan is to create a program to “inform businesses 
about the benefits of flexible work schedules for productivity and establishing positive workplaces; 
helping businesses create flexible work opportunities; and increasing federal incentives for 
telecommuting.” BarackObama.com, supra note 354. 
 360. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 4, at 107–08. 
0.6.0_PORTER FINAL 1/4/2010  10:33:16 AM 
2010] WHY CARE ABOUT CAREGIVERS? 407 
process regarding requests for workplace flexibility;361 strengthen the 
disparate impact theory of liability under Title VII;362 amend 
unemployment compensation laws to provide for benefits for employees 
who leave the workforce because of caregiving responsibilities;363 and 
strengthen the power of unions.364  While the details of such 
comprehensive reform are being left for another day, many of the above 
reforms would need to be included in order to end the caregiver 
conundrum for all caregivers, regardless of whether those workers need 
more time or more financial support. 
B. One Example: Protection Against Termination 
Even though it is not this Article’s purpose to engage in a detailed 
discussion of all of the reforms necessary to remedy the caregiver 
conundrum, it is helpful to give some idea of how the communitarian 
framework would justify at least one reform.  This sub-part will provide 
one example of a reform that would be a necessary part of the entire 
reform package to remedy the caregiver conundrum and then will 
describe how the communitarian theory justifies this particular reform. 
Some of the most troubling stories of work versus family conflict 
involve a caregiver having to make the impossible decision between 
leaving a child alone and losing one’s job.365  Employees tell heart-
                                                     
 361. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 359, at 65 (discussing how traditional lawmaking is 
unlikely to result in the needed flexibility to create more inclusive work practices); Travis, The Full-
Time, Face-Time Norm, supra note 11, at 266–67 (discussing the United Kingdom’s “right to 
request law,” which allows employees to request workplace flexibility without fear of retaliation and 
forces employers to respond to the request, denying it for only particular enumerated reasons).  In 
December 2007, the Working Family Flexibility Act was introduced in the Senate, which, if enacted, 
would give employees the right to request flexible work options to help them balance work and 
family, without the fear of retaliation by their employers.  While the law would not require 
employers to grant employees’ requests, it would require that employers engage in an interactive 
process and if they deny the request, the employers must explain the grounds for denial.  Working 
Families Flexibility Act, S. 2419, 110th Cong. (2007).  I believe these proposals for process rights 
are great first steps.  There is a great deal of benefit to allowing employees to be heard regarding 
their requests for work and life balance and forcing employers to take these requests seriously.  
Ultimately, however, I believe we need to move beyond process and toward more substantive rights 
for caregivers. 
 362. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 52, at 58 (suggesting that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
should be amended to codify the disparate impact theory); Travis, The Full-Time, Face-Time Norm, 
supra note 11, at 263 (discussing the success of disparate impact litigation in the United Kingdom). 
 363. Kessler, supra note 6, at 461. 
 364. Arnow-Richman, supra note 26, at 399, 409–16 (suggesting “revitalizing worker 
organization” as an important part of accommodating caregivers). 
 365. Healthy Families Act, S. 910, 110th Cong., § 2(9) (2007) (stating that the “absence of paid 
sick leave has forced Americans to make untenable choices between needed income on the one hand 
and caring for their own and their family’s health on the other”). 
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wrenching stories: losing a job because the employee’s child was in a car 
accident and had to be taken to the emergency room, forcing older 
children to miss school to stay home and care for young children who are 
sick, losing a job because the employee stayed home with her child who 
had the flu, and sending sick kids to school and daycare.366  The 
consequences of leaving children unattended can be even worse than 
losing one’s job.  In one example, a mother left her one-year-old and 
nine-year-old children alone because the babysitter did not arrive and her 
employer had threatened termination if she did not report to work.367  
While she was gone, the children died in a fire.368  Similarly, in another 
case, a two-year-old left alone fell from a balcony and died.369  These and 
countless other stories never told make this a prime area to begin the 
reform discussion.  Furthermore, while there are many employment 
actions that disadvantage caregivers—refusal to hire, lower pay, denied 
promotions—termination is certainly the most damaging employment 
decision,370 as the workplace equivalent of “capital punishment.”371  
Many people have their entire identity wrapped up in their job and 
occupation.  For them, termination means not only a loss of regular 
paychecks, but also means “dashed expectations as to future benefits, a 
loss of character and personal identity, and the loss of the financial 
security one expected.”372  One scholar has said this about termination: 
Dismissal affects a person’s economic, emotional, and physical health 
in ways unparalleled by less drastic forms of discipline or transitory 
interruptions of work.  Not only does dismissal have immediate 
financial consequences for the discharged worker, it also has an 
economic impact into the future . . . .  The loss of one’s job is felt not  
 
                                                     
 366. 9TO5, NAT’L ASS’N OF WORKING WOMEN, 10 THINGS THAT COULD HAPPEN TO YOU IF 
YOU DIDN’T HAVE PAID SICK DAYS: AND THE BEST WAY TO MAKE SURE THEY NEVER HAPPEN TO 
ANYONE, available at http://1000voicesarchive.org/resource/228/10things.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 
2009). 
 367. Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 2003, at N1. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment 
and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 116–17 (2008). 
 371. Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No Longer 
Pertain: “Right Sizing” and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 277–78 (2000); Donna 
E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-Will, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
351, 352–53 (2001) (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998)). 
 372. Schmall, supra note 371, at 278. 
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only by the individual worker but by members of his or her family and 
the community.373 
Certainly, the caregiver conundrum has far broader consequences than 
causing the termination of caregiving employees, but the significance of 
termination renders it a great place to start the reform efforts. 
Accordingly, a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, reform would 
protect employees against termination when they are performing 
mandatory caregiving tasks.374  Certainly, the devil is in the details, and 
there have been some efforts to define what these mandatory caregiving 
tasks might include.375  At a minimum, employees should be protected 
when they miss work because they have no responsible person with 
whom to leave a child under the age of twelve,376 despite having made 
reasonable efforts to find such a responsible person.  Such an emergency 
situation might arise because of the child’s illness that precludes the use 
of home or group-based daycare or school, because an in-home 
babysitter or nanny is too ill to care for the child or otherwise fails to 
show up for work, or because the child’s school is unexpectedly closed.  
Certainly there are likely to be disputes regarding what constitutes 
reasonable efforts to find alternative care arrangements, as well as who is 
a responsible person.377  Furthermore, such a prohibition might need 
limits on frequency—i.e., how often or how many times an employee 
should be protected from termination when they have caregiving 
emergencies.  These details are important but are not the focus of this 
Article.  Instead, the focus of this Article is to explain how the 
communitarian theory justifies this and other reforms.  I turn to that now. 
                                                     
 373. Young, supra note 371, at 353. 
 374. It is, for my current purposes, immaterial where such a prohibition appears.  However, it 
seems to make the most sense that the FMLA would be amended to include a provision that I am 
suggesting here.  However, if that were to be the locus of this prohibition, the coverage of the FMLA 
would need to be expanded to include all or almost all employees for at least this prohibition. 
 375. Kaminer, supra note 9, at 340–44. 
 376. Undoubtedly, this age limit could be debated.  I arrived at it rather informally.  I have a 
fifteen-year-old who was so mature that she was babysitting her two little sisters at twelve years of 
age.  I probably would have left her alone at ten years of age if I had the misfortune to be in the 
position to have to choose between leaving her alone and losing my job.  I realize how fortunate I am 
that I have never been forced to make such a decision.  But I also recognize that my daughter was 
more mature than most children and that many parents would feel uncomfortable leaving a ten or 
eleven-year-old unattended for an entire day, especially if that child was sick.  On the low end, I also 
have an eight-year-old and I would never consider leaving her alone for even a couple of hours, 
much less an entire workday.  Is there some debate regarding at what age between nine and twelve 
would be appropriate for leaving a child alone?  Certainly, but as stated above, the devil is in the 
details and this Article cannot solve all of these problems. 
 377. While those details would need to be fleshed out, as well as establishing documentation 
requirements, this Article does not and cannot discuss all of these details. 
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Both employers and non-caregiving coworkers might resent the law 
reform presented above.  Employers might resent it because such a 
reform would mean forced modifications to employers’ mandatory (and 
often very strict) attendance policies.  Some employers might also argue 
that such a law would allow for increased absences,378 which will 
decrease productivity and increase costs.  Non-caregiving coworkers 
might argue that such a law unfairly privileges the choices made by 
parents and that they (the non-caregiving employees) should benefit from 
having made the decision to not have children.  For instance, they might 
argue that other absences should similarly be protected, such as: 
absences for an employee’s own illness; absences because of 
unavoidable car trouble or other transportation problems; and absences 
because of a spouse’s or other family member’s illness or injury. 
How does the communitarian theory respond to these concerns?  
First, communitarian theory’s emphasis on the importance of raising 
children well and the dangers of leaving children alone demonstrates 
how important such a reform would be.379  It is precisely this type of 
neglect (leaving children unattended) that can lead to serious 
consequences, not just for the child and his family, but for all of 
society.380  Because the consequences of leaving children unattended are 
so serious, parents should not be forced to make a decision between the 
welfare of their children and financial security.381  When parents lose 
                                                     
 378. There is a counter-argument to such an allegation.  Under current law, if an employee is in 
a position where the employee’s child is sick and the employee is out of absences—assume a no-
fault absence system, where the employer allows a limited number of absences—the employee 
would be tempted to find a way to come under the protection of the FMLA, if the employee works 
for an employer covered by the FMLA and if the employee is eligible for FMLA leave, as indicated 
by her years of service and hours worked in the past year.  See supra Part III.C.  To obtain FMLA 
protection, the employee would need to show that her child had a serious health condition.  29 
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006).  Many children’s illnesses do not qualify as a serious health 
condition either because they are short in duration or they do not require the care of a medical 
professional.  Gershuny, supra note 52, at 203–04; see also § 2611(11).  In these cases, the employee 
might feel compelled to try to claim that the illness falls under the umbrella of a serious health 
condition to avoid termination under the attendance policy.  If they do so, they might be forced to 
make a shorter illness last longer in order to fit the definition of serious health condition.  
Anecdotally, I have seen many employees use, or perhaps abuse, the FMLA in this way and such 
over-uses or abuses do not benefit anyone.  Employees should be protected when they are forced to 
miss work because of mandatory caregiving responsibilities. 
 379. See Healthy Families Act S. 910 110th Cong., § 2(15) (2007) (stating that “[it] is in the 
national interest to ensure that all Americans can care for their own health and the health of their 
families while prospering at work”). 
 380. As just one example, if a parent sends a sick child to daycare or school because the parent 
cannot miss work without being terminated, the child is likely to infect other children, which affects 
other employees. 
 381. The Healthy Families Act makes a similar point: section 2(9) states that the absence of paid 
sick days has forced Americans to make untenable choices between needed income and jobs on the 
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their jobs, it has negative consequences on the children as well, who may 
grow up in poverty, and are more likely to suffer from abuse at the hands 
of their distraught parents.382 
Second, communitarian theory demonstrates that parenting well is 
not merely a choice, but a responsibility.383  At the very minimum, 
parenting well includes not leaving a young child unattended for an 
entire workday.  Because refusing to leave a child unattended is a 
parent’s responsibility, not just a parent’s choice, parents should be given 
at least the bare minimum assistance necessary to allow them to meet this 
very minimal parenting obligation.  Understanding parenting as a 
responsibility rather than a choice responds to concerns of non-
caregivers, who might resent the fact that parenting absences are excused 
when other absences are not.  Many of us might agree that other types of 
absences should be excused, but the difference between the absences that 
non-caregivers might wish to have excused and absences caused by 
mandatory caregiving responsibilities is that those involving caregiving 
do not just affect the employee—they affect the child and the proper 
upbringing of children is important, not just to the child and his family, 
but to society as a whole.384  Thus, embracing communitarian theory can 
help to justify this reform, which will in turn help solve the caregiver 
conundrum. 
While the example above is probably one of the most important 
protections that could be offered to caregivers, it is certainly not 
sufficient by itself.  Only a comprehensive solution will truly solve the 
caregiver conundrum.  Until now, much of the resistance to such 
comprehensive reform came in the form of apathy (why should we care 
about the choices made by working caregivers?) and resentment (why 
should working caregivers get any special benefits for the choices they 
have made?).  However, if we embrace the communitarian lesson 
regarding the importance of caregiving, hopefully we get beyond apathy 
and resentment and toward a society that respects “the most difficult job 
you will ever love.” 
                                                                                                                       
one hand, and caring for their own and their family’s health on the other.  S. 910. 
 382. Gershuny, supra note 52, at 198–99, 213–14 (pointing out how many children live in 
poverty, and noting that as a parent’s income plummets, the parent is more likely to degrade and 
abuse the children). 
 383. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 384. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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C. Responding to the Critics—What Reform Will Not Do 
As stated above, this Article does not discuss the details of the 
eventual reform that will be needed to solve the caregiver conundrum.  
However, this sub-part will address the two common criticisms that will 
likely be levied against any proposed reform efforts.  The first criticism 
is that proposals to remedy caregiver discrimination will put too much of 
a financial burden on employers.  Even though employers would not be 
at a competitive disadvantage with other U.S. employers (because they 
would all be subject to the same laws), there is a concern that additional 
employer mandates will put U.S. companies at a competitive 
disadvantage in the global marketplace.  The second criticism is that 
reform might put too much of a burden on coworkers.  I will address 
each of these criticisms in turn. 
It is true that any employer mandate might cost employers money.  
But many of the needed reforms are relatively inexpensive, and to the 
extent that they cost money, that cost is often offset by increased 
employee morale, loyalty and retention.  Some of the reforms that would 
be relatively inexpensive and even result in a net gain to employers 
(when considering decreased attrition) are measures like flex-time, work 
from home arrangements, job sharing, part time or reduced hour 
arrangements (with a requisite reduction in pay and benefits), and 
process laws, which require employers to engage in a process regarding 
requests for workplace flexibility.385  Some reform measures will impose 
some costs on employers that might not be offset by decreased attrition, 
but are not likely to be cost-prohibitive.  I am referring here to an 
expansion of the FMLA to include smaller employers (25 or more 
employees, rather than 50), or to include some time off for more routine 
caregiving needs.  Because the FMLA only allows for unpaid leave, 
these measures will not be overly expensive.  Certainly, it does cost 
money for an employer to give even an unpaid leave of absence (and be 
required to leave the job open for the employee as the FMLA requires) 
but the cost should not be prohibitive.  Most importantly, however, the 
measures that would likely be considered expensive, such as paid leave, 
national daycare, longer school days, or other measures that are needed 
to help lower-income employees, would have to be subsidized and 
supported by the government.  Because all of society benefits from the 
caregiving tasks performed by working caregivers, the government 
should be involved in supporting this socially desirable behavior. 
                                                     
 385. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Turning now to the second criticism, that remedying the caregiver 
conundrum would put an undue burden on other employees, there are a 
few responses.  First, when this Article proposes that other employees 
support rather than sabotage reform efforts, this does not mean that non-
caregiving coworkers should have to take on the work of the caregiving 
employees.  That is not what reform would do.  Some part of the reform 
might encourage, incentivize or require employers to offer more 
flexibility to caregiving employees, but that does not mean that 
employees that get that flexibility get a pass on getting their jobs done.  
Furthermore, even if employers are meeting some of the needs of 
caregiving employees, it is unlikely that employers would naturally place 
extra burdens on coworkers.  Analogously, there seems to be a real 
reluctance to do so in the disability context.  For instance, employers are 
reluctant to infringe on another employee’s seniority rights by 
reassigning an employee with a disability instead of a more senior non-
disabled employee.386  Finally, to safeguard against this possibility (no 
matter how remote), any law reform that would give benefits to 
caregivers should include a provision that can be analogized to the 
proviso in the Equal Pay Act (EPA) that forbids an employer from 
complying with the EPA by lowering wages of men.387  Here, employers 
should be forbidden from complying with the legal requirements with 
regard to caregivers (whatever those might eventually be) by forcing 
coworkers to pick up the slack. 
As stated earlier, this Article does not discuss in detail all of the 
reform measures that might be required to remedy the caregiver 
conundrum.  Accordingly, there are likely to be additional criticisms to 
any eventual reform that are not addressed here.  However, what should 
be clear from the above discussion is that reform does not have to lead to 
overly cumbersome burdens on either employers or non-caregiving 
coworkers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Why care about caregivers?  We should care about caregivers 
because they are raising the next generation (or caring for the prior 
generation), and their success in that endeavor benefits us all.  
Communitarian theory helps us recognize that we are not just a society of 
individuals roaming around; we are interconnected in such a way that our 
                                                     
 386. See, e.g., U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 391 (2002). 
 387. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).  The EPA forbids an employer from paying female employees 
less than its male employees for performing equal work.  Id. 
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actions affect one another.  If we care about our future generations, we 
must do what we can to help parents raise future generations, and this 
entails helping caregivers balance work and family.  Reform efforts to 
remedy caregiver discrimination must protect all caregivers, including 
real workers, not just ideal workers.  There are costs to caring.  But not 
caring comes with the biggest cost of all—children (and adults) with 
caregivers who do not have enough time to care for them.388 
 
                                                     
 388. See Kaminer, supra note 9, at 316 (discussing the harm to children if parents are not given 
workplace accommodations that allow them to adequately care for their children). 
